Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation by Myers, Minor & Korsmo, Charles R.
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
2017
Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation
Minor Myers
Brooklyn Law School, minor.myers@brooklaw.edu
Charles R. Korsmo
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Organizations Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
41 Del. J. Corp. L. 279 (2016-2017)
REFORMING MODERN APPRAISAL LITIGATION
CHARLES KORSMO & MINOR MYERS*
ABSTRACT
This Article demonstrates that appraisal claims in Delaware
during the most recent period of activity continue to exhibit multiple
proxies for legal merit, suggesting that modern appraisal litigation plays
a salutary, if small, role in M&A practice. This Article also provides an
account of how appraisal-in spite of its empirical virtues-has sparked
a backlash among a group of defendants and deal advisors. They have
pressed Delaware policymakers to consider an amendment that would,
among other things, deprive beneficial owners of appraisal rights if they
were not beneficial owners on a record date set by the target board. In
practice, this would limit the utility of the appraisal remedy and the
beneficial effects of trading in appraisal-eligible shares. Very little
substantive argument has been offered publicly to justify the deal
lawyers' amendment, but we attempt to engage with what we regard as
the most plausible arguments in its favor: that appraisal as currently
practiced threatens the vitality of the deal market and that it enriches
dissenters at the expense of other stockholders. These arguments are
without empirical support and as a matter of theory cannot withstand
sustained scrutiny. In the final analysis, this effort to alter Delaware's
appraisal statute stands, at best, as a misguided effort to promote bad
policy or, at worst, as a deliberate attempt to scuttle the only serious
merger-related remedy available to stockholders of Delaware firms.
We propose an alternative set of reforms that would enhance the
effectiveness of the appraisal remedy. Delaware should require
disclosure of more financial information in appraisal-eligible
transactions; eliminate the irrational exemption for all-stock
transactions; and adopt a de minimis requirement. The system of
awarding interest to dissenters can be improved in ways we sketch out
here but develop fully in a separate paper. Lastly, we offer a simple way
to meet the demand of the deal advisors-that appraisal eligibility be
*Korsmo is Associate Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, and Myers is Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School. We have received helpful
feedback from participants in Vanderbilt's Law & Business Seminar and in a University of
Virginia Faculty Workshop. We are the principals of Stermax Partners, which provides
compensated advice on stockholder appraisal and manages appraisal-related investments, and
we have economic interests in the outcome of appraisal proceedings. We received no
compensation for the preparation of this Article, and none of the views expressed here were
developed directly out of our advisory work, although, of course, general experience serves as
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tied to a record date set by the board-without forsaking the governance
virtues of an active appraisal market: Delaware law should require that
any applicable record date be set for not earlier than 20 days following
the mailing of notice of appraisal rights. This would ensure that
stockholders and other market participants are able to see crucial
disclosures before the record date. It thus represents a sensible
compromise by giving deal advisors what they've demanded without
destroying the policy benefits of appraisal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past five years, the stockholder's appraisal remedy has
been transformed from a forgettable attribute of stock ownership in
Delaware to a potent option for dissidents.' Appraisal now stands as a
formidable mechanism of deterrence to opportunistic mergers, although
that deterrence is partial at best.2 In spite of the increase in activity,
appraisal petitions still account for only one out of every twenty merger-
related lawsuits. Nevertheless, appraisal has struck a chord with
defendants and defense lawyers, who are pushing Delaware to adopt
amendments that would curb appraisal activity in important ways. The
bizarre aspect about this lobbying effort is that it seems wholly
unmoored from'any evidence on what is actually happening in appraisal.
For an issue of such importance, it is crucial that any potential
reform be grounded not in spooky stories but instead in the hard reality
of what is happening on the ground. We have examined the incidence of
appraisal before, but things are changing rapidly. The focus of this
Article is chiefly on the period from 2011 through 2014, when appraisal
activity has been higher than any point in the past. Even in this era of
heightened appraisal litigation, the empirical picture is an encouraging
one. Stockholders dissent in a small number of transactions and focus on
transactions where there is reason to suspect opportunism. Appraisal
petitions are associated with deals that have abnormally low merger
premia and are also associated with insider buyouts.4 The outcomes of
appraisal petitions are also notable: a far larger percentage of claims go
to trial than, for example, merger class actions, suggesting that appraisal
petitioners are unusually dogged in pressing their claims. Trial results
from public company appraisal petitions have, on average, awarded a
slight premium to the dissenting group. The median outcome is less than
a 2% premium to the merger price, and the mean outcome is a premium
'See generally Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future
of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REv. 1551 (2015) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers,
Appraisal Arbitrage]; See generally Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of
Stockholder Litigation: When do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 880-81, 890-94
(2014) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Structure of Stockholder Litigation].2See generally James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Addressing Agency Costs
Through Private Litigation in the U.S.: Tensions, Disappointments, and Substitutes, at 39-40
(Sept. 2, 2015) (describing limitations of appraisal remedy), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/35 19.3See Peter E. Kazanoff & Paul C. Gluckow, Appraisal Arbitrageur's Standing
Reaffirmed by Chancery Court, DEL. Bus. COURT INSIDER, (Feb. 3, 2015) (noting that deal
advisors are "waging an escalating battle" and that "the fight is likely to continue to be played
out before the Delaware Chancery and Supreme courts and in the General Assembly").4Korsmo & Myers, AppraisalArbitrage, supra note 1, at 1555.
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of slightly more than 10%. Together these results suggest a system of
private enforcement that is working well, if substantially short of its full
potential.
The rise of modem appraisal has naturally prompted a re-
evaluation of the appraisal remedy and consideration of possible reforms.
In late 2014 and early 2015, Delaware's blue-ribbon corporate reform
committee-the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware
State Bar Association-examined the appraisal statute and proposed only
modest changes, intended to prevent interest rate arbitrage and the
bringing of small claims for nuisance value.5 We regard the proposed
changes as positive on balance, and at worst benign.6
Over the past few years, however, a group of influential critics of
appraisal have emerged, and they now have pressed for a far more
radical overhaul of the appraisal statute.7 Most prominent among the
critics are a group of deal lawyers led by the New York law firm
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.8 The management of the Dole Food
Company, which was the subject of a large appraisal action over a
management-led going-private transaction, similarly pressed for radical
change, though they appear to have largely fallen silent since an August
2015 court opinion found that Dole's managers-the very same ones who
agitated for undermining appraisal rights-had engaged in a scheme of
pervasive fraud upon public stockholders. 9 The deal lawyers have called
for curtailing appraisal arbitrage by reducing the statutory interest rate
and overturning a line of Delaware case law that stretches back half a
century.1° The deal advisors press for an amendment to the appraisal
5See Proposed 2015 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law,
available at http://tinyurl.com/sk-proposed-DGCL.
6We discuss the interest rate proposal below. The "de minimus" requirement would
allow respondents to automatically dismiss claims where less than 1% of shares seek appraisal
or where the aggregate value of the shares seeking appraisal does not exceed $1 million. This
proposal strikes us as sensible, in that such small claims can have little deterrence value,
consume judicial resources, and pose a heightened risk of nuisance litigation intended to
capture avoided litigation costs. The data shows, however, that such tactics are rare.
7See, e.g., Wei Jiang, Reforming the Delaware Law to Address Appraisal Arbitrage,
HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (May 12, 2016),
http://tinyurl.com/HLS-16vl2; Daniel G. Dufier, Jr., Michael Deyong, & Kristen Rohr,
Increasing Hostility Towards Appraisal Arbitrage (Apr. 17, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/WC-
Dufher-15ivl7.
8See, e.g., Theodore N. Mirvis, Trevor S. Norwitz, Andrew J. Nussbaum, William
Savitt & Ryan A. McLeod, Delaware Court Decisions on Appraisal Rights Highlight Need for
Reform, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Jan. 21,
2015) http://tinyurl.conHLS-21i15.
91n re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, *2 (Del. Ch. Aug.
27, 2015).
10See Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 WL 67586, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan.
5, 2015) (holding that "Section 262 permits the existence of appraisal arbitrage by allowing
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statute that would strip beneficial holders of their appraisal rights if they
were not beneficial owners on a record date set by the target board.11 As
explained below, in practice this would require appraisal specialists to
buy their shares before the record date for voting on the merger-not
only long before the vote date but also, crucially, before the target
company has mailed its proxy statement to stockholders. Dole
management had gone further, lobbying the Delaware legislature and the
Governor's office to eliminate appraisal altogether for any stockholder
who did not own its shares at the time a merger is announced.
12
The arguments advanced in favor of these radical changes to the
appraisal statute are often somewhat nebulous. 13  To the extent it is
possible to discern the supposed policy justifications for the amendment,
they boil down to claims like the following: The threat of appraisal
liability will frustrate many beneficial deals, keeping stockholders from
getting the benefit of some set of merger proposals that will now go
unmade. Merger agreements might cabin appraisal liability by including
a closing condition allowing the acquirer to walk away if more than some
specified percentage of stockholders demands appraisal, but that solution
is unattractive to sellers (because it reduces the certainty of the deal) and
also to buyers (because it allows dissenting stockholders to veto the
transaction). The result of this uncertainty, in the transactional advisor's
view, is that acquirers facing potential appraisal liability will lower their
bid to account for the expectation of an appraisal suit and non-dissenting
stockholders will be penalized by this holdback.
These arguments cannot withstand scrutiny. Merger parties
control the appraisal liability they face, as deal advisors themselves
investors to petition for appraisal of stock purchased after a merger is announced" and that "the
unambiguous language of the statute does not give rise to any such share-tracing
requirement"); In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 2007 WL 1378345, at *4 (Del.
Ch. May 2, 2007) ("[F]ollowing the clear teachings of Olivetti Underwood Corp., I conclude
[...] that only Cede's actions, as the record holder, are relevant. [T]he actions of the beneficial
holders are irrelevant in appraisal matters."); Olivetti Underwood Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co.,
217 A.2d 683, 686 (1966) ("[T]here is no recognizable stockowner under the merger-appraisal
provisions of our Corporation Law except a registered stockholder.").
"See Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Poised to Embrace Appraisal Arbitrage,
HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://tinyurl.com/HLS-09iii 15.
12Jonathan Starkey, Dole pressures Delaware on corporate law changes,
DELAWAREONLINE: THE NEWS JOURNAL (Mar. 12, 2015, 8:48 AM), http://tinyurl.com/Del-
nj-1 liiil5.
13See, e.g., Dufner et al., supra note 7 ("While statutory appraisal remedies are
intended to protect minority stockholders by enabling those who dissent to request a judicial
determination of the fair value of their shares in a takeover context, this public policy rationale
is absent from the current trend of increasing appraisal claims brought by institutional
investors that engage in 'appraisal arbitrage' as they invest in target companies upon a takeover
announcement with the intention of exercising appraisal rights.").
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acknowledge. One law firm memo put it this way: "[T]he transactions
that attract appraisal petitions generally involve some basis for a belief
that the deal price significantly undervalues the company-that is,
transactions involving controlling stockholders, management buyouts, or
other transactions for which there did not appear to be a meaningful
market check or significant minority shareholder protections as part of
the sales process."' 14 At the other end of the spectrum, the surest way to
avoid appraisal liability is to see that the target got the best price
available. Appraisal specialists focus on strong claims, and if the claim
is not strong, it will not attract their attention. 15 It is precisely the threat
of appraisal liability, in other words, that should prevent acquirers from
holding back value in merger negotiations. And given the litigation
patterns we document here-where appraisal petitions focus on
abnormally low merger premia and on insider deals-it may be safe to
assume that any transaction deterred by appraisal liability is evidence of
the system working well.16
The Delaware legislature, unusually, did not act on the appraisal-
related proposals from the Council in 2015.17 Many have suggested that
the Council should revisit the issue in the winter of 2015-16.18 Indeed,
the Council re-recommended the same amendments to the appraisal
statute in 2016, and they were finally enacted by the legislature, over the
summer of 2016.]9 Thus far, the Council has rejected proposals for
radical change, but given the influence of the deal advisors in Delaware,
the Council will surely reexamine such proposals in the future. The
Council should reject them. Instead, it should consider a number of
amendments to expand and improve the appraisal remedy: eliminating
the exception for all-stock transactions and requiring more disclosure
from companies so that stockholders are in a position to make an
informed decision about exercising their appraisal rights.
Even if the Council were to propose an amendment that would
strip beneficial owners of their appraisal rights unless they were
14Abigail Pickering Bomba, Steven Epstein, Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Peter S. Golden,
Philip Richter, Robert C. Schwenkel, David N. Shine, John E. Sorkin, Gail Weinstein, New
Activist Weapon: The Rise of Delaware Appraisal Arbitrage: A Survey of Cases and Some
Practical Implications, FRIED FRANK, 4 (2014), http://tinyurl.com/FF-6947.
'See infra Part L.A
6See Korsmo & Myers, AppraisalArbitrage, supra note 1, at 1555.17See generally Kazanoff & Gluckow, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that deal advisors are
"waging an escalating battle" and that "the fight is likely to continue to be played out before
the Delaware Chancery and Supreme courts and in the General Assembly").
181d
19Michael Greene, New Delaware Laws Impacting Mergers and Acquisitions
Highlight Second Quarter, CORPORATE LAW & ACCOUNTABrLITY REPORT (July 15, 2016),
http://tinyurl.com/FF-I 6viil6.
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beneficial owners on the record date, the Council should at the same time
limit the discretion of the board to select a record date that deprives
stockholders of information when they need it most. In particular, target
boards should not be permitted to set a record date that is less than 20
days after the mailing of notice of appraisal rights to target stockholders.
This would meet the stated goals of the critics while at the same time
preserving the valuable governance role of modem appraisal.
Part I provides an empirical picture of both the incidence and
outcome of stockholder appraisal litigation, focusing on the period from
2011 to 2014. The focus of Part II is a narrative description of the rise of
appraisal activity and the backlash it has provoked among defense
lawyers and defendants. Part III considers the various critiques that
defense lawyers have offered of modem appraisal and the reforms they
have advocated; the critiques generally fall flat and the reforms are
inadvisable. A more sensible set of reforms are offered in Part IV, which
details ways in which the appraisal remedy in Delaware can be made
more effective.
II. AN EMPIRICAL PICTURE OF MODERN APPRAISAL LITIGATION
Given the sweeping nature of the reforms pressed by the defense
bar, it is imperative to ensure that the debate be grounded in a realistic
picture of modern appraisal practice. This Part presents that empirical
picture of both the incidence of appraisal petitions and, to the extent
publicly observable, their outcome.
The world of active appraisal litigation is still new, and thus the
focus of our attention is the period from 2011 through 2014, when
appraisal activity was more substantial than in prior years. Our analysis
here reveals that appraisal litigation resources are focused on a small
subset of transactions. In addition, the targeted transactions continue to
stand out as having unusually low premia and an especially high
likelihood of insider participation. In terms of outcomes, approximately
15% of filed appraisal petitions go to trial, an unusually high rate for
merger litigation. 20 The cases that go to trial, of course, are a non-
random selection of cases; we would not expect them necessarily to have
an exceptionally high or low trial award. Consistent with this prediction,
judicial opinions following trial award on average a modest premium; the
median award is less than 2% and the mean is about 10.5%.
20Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei & Randall Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder
Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage 5 (Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 16-31,
2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2766 7 76 .
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As a baseline comparison, we present comparable figures for
merger class action litigation during the same period. They are filed
against nearly every transaction, with the volume of merger class actions
approximately 20 times that of appraisal litigation. These filings targeted
deals with no statistically significant regard for the merger price and
instead are associated with transaction size. In terms of outcomes, they
are nearly always settled when not dismissed. In the world of merger
litigation, appraisal appears to be working unusually well.
A. The Incidence of Appraisal
The first policy-relevant empirical question is what deals are
targeted by appraisal petitions. The conventional view of appraisal has
long been as a remedy that is used infrequently by stockholders. And,
indeed, this view was consistent with actual litigation patterns through
2010. Beginning in around 2011, however, there has been a substantial
increase in appraisal activity, as measured by multiple metrics. As we
21have shown elsewhere, this increase in appraisal activity did not, in its
early years, proceed in an indiscriminate, blunderbuss fashion. Instead, it
constituted a focused attack on the adequacy of the merger price in a
relatively small number of transactions.22 Moreover, the transactions
targeted for appraisal challenges were associated with insider buyouts
and lower-than-expected merger premia-precisely the deals where
minority shareholders were more likely to have been mistreated.23 The
picture, in other words, was a regime of legal rights that worked well in
terms of channeling challenges into the right transactions. To the extent
there was an apparent problem, it was a problem of under-enforcement.
The backlash that has emerged in recent years, however, may indicate
that something has changed in the pattern of litigation. Perhaps there has
been an increase in small-value nuisance suits or an increasingly
indiscriminate pattern of litigation activity.24
21 See generally Korsmo & Myers, Structure of Stockholder Litigation, supra note 1;
Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1.22See Korsmo & Myers, AppraisalArbitrage, supra note 1, at 1569 (showing in Figure
2 that the incidence of appraisal petitions has never exceeded 17% of appraisal-eligible
transactions).23See id. at 1555; Wei Jiang, Tao Li & Danqing Mei, Influencing Control: Jawboning
in Risk Arbitrage 14-15 (Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 15-41, 2016),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-2587925.
24One recent Chancery Court opinion expressed concerns along these lines. See
Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 WL 67586, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) ("It
may be true that the plain language of Section 262 does not adequately serve all the purposes
of that statute. It is possible that appraisal arbitrage itself leads to unwholesome litigation.
However, in evaluating my role in alleviating these concerns through the adjudication of this
2017
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To provide the debate with a firm factual footing, we collect and
analyze data on appraisal activity involving public company transactions
consummated through the end of 2014. We examine three metrics of
appraisal activity: the transactions challenged in appraisal proceedings,
the number of appraisal petitions filed, and the percentage of equity
value held by dissenting stockholders. Across various metrics, we find
that the intensity of activity fell slightly in 2014 from 2013 levels, but
that the general trend has been consistent since 2011.
We present these and other summary statistics on appraisal activity
in Delaware below. To provide some context, we also report-where
possible-comparable data on merger class actions. Our underlying data
involves all public-company merger transactions that triggered
stockholders' appraisal rights in Delaware. Stockholders have two
potential methods for legally challenging such transactions-a merger
class action and an appraisal petition-and we are able to compare which
transactions attracted what type of legal challenge. Not all mergers are
appraisal-eligible in Delaware, because Delaware law denies appraisal
rights to stockholders in all-stock transactions.25  Only when
stockholders are required to accept cash (or various other non-stock
forms of consideration) does the merger trigger the stockholders'
appraisal rights.26 As we explain below, 27 this limitation makes no sense
as a policy matter. But to ensure that we are comparing apples to apples,
we restrict the purview of our analysis to appraisal-eligible transactions.
1. Transaction-level Appraisal Challenges
The number of appraisal-eligible transactions in 2014 reached an
all-time low during the 11-year period for which we have data. Only 86
transactions in our data were eligible for appraisal, and thirteen of those
attracted filed appraisal petitions. This 2014 rate of filing-15.1%-is
consistent with the larger trend of increased appraisal activity that began
in 2011. Figure 1 below shows the percentage of appraisal-eligible deals
each year that faced an appraisal petition.
case, I find former Chancellor Chandler's words in Transkaryotic-wherein over seven years
ago he considered whether his decision would "'pervert the goals of the appraisal statute by
allowing it to be used as an investment tool for arbitrageurs'-to be particularly apposite: 'To
the extent that [these] concern[s] ha[ve] validity, relief more properly lies with the Legislature.
Section 262, as currently drafted, dictates the conclusion reached here ... The Legislature, not
this Court, possesses the power to modify § 262 to avoid the evil[s], if [they are] evil[s], that
purportedly concern[ ] [the Respondent].").
2 See 8 Del. C. § 262(b).261d.; See Korsmo & Myers, Structure of Stockholder Litigation, supra note 1, at 860.27See infra Part IV.A.
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Between 2011 and 2014, an average of 13.8% of transactions have
triggered the filing of at least one appraisal petition. From 2004 through
2010, by contrast, 4.5% of transactions faced an appraisal filing. As we
explain below, this rate somewhat overstates the actual intensity of
appraisal activity because a number of these challenges involve trivially
small amounts of stock. At the same time, this rate necessarily excludes
appraisal disputes that settle prior to any petition being filed.
Figure 1
Percentage of Deals Challenged by Appraisal Challenge, 2004-14
2 0 .0 % . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15.0% -
10.0%
0.0%-
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
For comparison, the rate at which the same universe of mergers
was challenged by a class action lawsuit-the other available form of
potential legal relief-was 88% between 2011 and 2014. In other words,
approximately seven out of eight appraisal-eligible mergers are
challenged by class actions, whereas only slightly more than one out of
eight is challenged in appraisal. The ubiquity of merger class actions
during this period was widely regarded as evidence of a litigation
epidemic that cries out for a policy solution.2 8 By contrast, the raw
appraisal rate is not self-evidently high, in our view.
Which deals are challenged in appraisal proceedings? Whatever
the effects of appraisal litigation, the appraisal remedy can only hope to
be an effective tool of corporate governance if it targets deals that ought
to be targeted-those with the greatest risk of mistreatment of minority
stockholders. We thus compare the attributes of transactions that
28See generally Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The
Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 484-86 (2015)
(discussing various responses from the legal community describing the epidemic as
"detrimental to both shareholders and corporate law," "'fee distribution' opportunities sought
out by plaintiffs' attorneys," and an implication of "potential systemic dysfunction.").
2017
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attracted at least one appraisal petition against those that did not. We
again focus here on the four-year period from 2011 through 2014, when
appraisal litigation has been most active.
The transactions can be broken down in multiple different ways.
In particular, we examined various measures of the firm's size, whether
the merger was involved a strategic or financial buyer, and whether an
insider was part of the buyout group. We also use a calculated variable
we call the premium residual, which is the difference between the actual
merger premium and the merger premium we would expect given the
size and industry of the target and the year of the acquisition. 29 When a
premium residual is negative, it indicates that the actual premium is
lower than the expected premium; a positive premium residual means
that the actual premium exceeds the expected premium.30 We would
expect transactions involving financial and insider buyers and negative
premium residuals to pose a greater risk of expropriation from minority
stockholders, with the firm's size largely irrelevant. Table 1 below
presents summary statistics on which deals attract appraisal litigation.
29For additional explanation of the premium residual, see Korsmo & Myers, Structure
of Stockholder Litigation, supra note 1, at 872.3 0
1d.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Transactions Challenged in Appraisal
Non-appraisal Appraisal
aprasa s TransactionsTransactions
Firm size billion billion
Enterprise value $1.9 $1.8
(mean)
Equity value $1.6 $1.7
(mean)
Premium residual
(mean)
1-day 1.9% -14.5%
1-week 2.9% -15.4%
4-week 3.8% -19.5%
Strategic merger 47% 42%
Insider participation 7.8% 18.6%
Financial buyer 24% 33%
The transactions targeted by appraisal are nearly indistinguishable
from non-appraisal transactions in terms of size. By contrast, a
substantial difference is evident across all measures of premium residual.
The average premium residual is substantially lower for the appraisal
deals than for non-appraisal deals. The proportion of strategic
transactions challenged in appraisal is slightly lower than in other deals.
Insider participation is more than twice as common among deals facing
an appraisal challenge than those that do not.
We analyze the incidence of appraisal petitions in logit
regressions, focusing again only on the period from 2011 through 2014.
Our dependent variable is whether the transaction faces an appraisal
petition, and our independent variables are measures of size, measures of
premium residual, and dummy variables for synergistic merger, a
financial buyer, and insider participation. We present the results in Table
A in the Appendix. The only variables with a statistically significant
2017
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effect are the merger premium residual and the presence of insider
participation. The lower the premium residual, the higher the likelihood
of an appraisal petition. The presence of an insider in the buyer group
increases the chance of an appraisal petition. Both of these are consistent
with the conclusion that appraisal petitioners focus their resources on
meritorious claims.
One persistent claim by critics of appraisal is that, by focusing on
filed petitions, our data understate the actual amount of appraisal
litigation. The implication apparently meant to be drawn is that a fuller
view of appraisal activity would reveal a dramatically different
landscape, rife with meritless nuisance claims. It is, of course, true that
the only observable petitions are those that are filed with the court, which
means any appraisal claims that settle before a filing will remain unseen.
There are, no doubt, more appraisal demands than there are appraisal
petitions. This is neither surprising nor scandalous. Just as an employer
may settle with a wrongfully terminated employee without a court case,
or an insurance company may settle quickly with an injured motorist
where liability is clear, a firm may also settle with a dissenting
stockholder so quickly that the stockholder never needs to file a petition.
Practitioners have reported to us that as many as one in four appraisal
demands settles without a public filing. Even if such cases were
dramatically different from cases involving filed petitions, they would
likely not alter the overall picture significantly.
More importantly for our purposes, it is highly unlikely that the
appraisal demands that settle early are different from the filed petitions in
the way appraisal critics imply. To reach the conclusion drawn by the
critics, one would have to believe that defense lawyers and their clients
are systematically choosing to settle unusually weak claims quickly,
while refusing to settle especially strong claims.31 We suspect that such
an illogical practice is precisely the opposite of reality, and that it is far
3
'Another reason defense lawyers might seek to settle in advance of trial is if the
dissenter's stake is small in relation to the costs of defense. Such settlements are surely part of
the pre-filing picture, but this phenomenon is hardly unique to appraisal. Any time the costs of
defense are non-zero, there is some residual risk of nuisance litigation. As we explain below,
the structural features of appraisal render this strategy far less attractive for appraisal
petitioners than in other contexts. Given the real costs of pursuing an appraisal claim,
nuisance suits become largely self-deterring in the absence of a credible threat to go to trial.
That is not to say small suits never happen, but a handful of settlements with claimants trying
to exploit the costs of defense is not the pressing public policy problem that defense lawyers
suggest appraisal now constitutes. Moreover, the prophylactic measure proposed by the
Council, of instituting a de minimis requirement for appraisal, is targeted at this potential
problem. In view of the failure of appraisal critics to embrace the de minimis requirement, it is
safe to assume that small claimants in appraisal are more of a rhetorical move than a genuine
concern.
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more likely that it is the unusually strong cases that respondents choose
to settle quickly rather than fight. As a result, though we cannot observe
the appraisal claims settled without a public filing, we regard it as highly
likely that the inclusion of such claims would make our results-that
appraisal petitioners as a whole focus on cases that exhibit proxies for
legal merit-stronger, not weaker.
2. Number of Complaints Filed
Another measure of appraisal activity is the raw number of
petitions filed. Though widely cited in the popular press, 32 this number
has somewhat less practical significance than the number of deals
challenged. For a defendant, facing multiple petitions is generally no
different than facing a single petition, as the petitions will inevitably be
consolidated into one judicial proceeding. Moreover, dissenters need not
file a petition themselves to share in the outcome from an appraisal
proceeding filed by another dissenter. As a result, multiple filings are
usually of secondary interest, largely signifying a desire among
numerous dissenting stockholders to participate in control of the case or
to publicize their involvement.
In classifying the filing of petitions, we focus-as before-on the
effective date of the challenged transaction, rather than the date on which
the actual petition was filed. Dissenting stockholders have 120 days
following the closing of the transaction in which to file their petition.33
Thus, the lag between the investment date and the petition date can be as
much as four months. To preserve their appraisal rights, however,
stockholders must decide to dissent much earlier, prior to the closing
date.34 Thus, for getting a sense of when dissenting stockholders are
deciding to exercise their appraisal rights, the filing date for the petition
is less informative than the closing date of the challenged transaction.
We date each filed petition by the effective date of the challenged
transaction. The filings are shown in Figure 2 below.
32See, e.g., Liz Hoffman, Hedge Funds Wield Risky Legal Ploy to Milk Buyouts, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2014), http://tinyurl.com/WSJ-13iv14; Liz Hoffinan, Judge Rules in Favor of
Hedge Fund 'Appraisal Arbitrage' Strategy, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://tinyurl.com/WSJ-7i 15.
3 See 8 Del. C. § 262(e).
34Among other things, would-be dissenters must give notice of intent to pursue
appraisal, generally prior to any shareholder vote. See 8 Del. C. § 262(d).
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Figure 2
Appraisal petition filings by transaction year, 2004 to 2014
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There was a spike in the number of appraisal petitions filed
challenging 2013 transactions, but in 2014 the filing level dropped back
to the 2011-12 level. The average number of filings during the recent
burst of appraisal activity from 2011 through 2014 was approximately 22
per year, and the average number from 2004 through 2010 was
approximately 9 per year. This increase in filings beginning in 2011 is
consistent with the more general increase in appraisal activity around that
time.
The volume of appraisal petitions is trivial in comparison to the
volume of merger class action filings. From 2011 through 2014, the
number of merger class actions challenging the same universe of
appraisal-eligible transactions averaged 426 lawsuit filings per year, or
nearly twenty times the volume of appraisal petitions during the same
period. In other words, appraisal petitions represented less than 5% of all
merger-related lawsuits during the period, even for deals where appraisal
was available as a remedy.
3. Equity Value of Dissenting Shares
Not all appraisal filings are alike in economic significance, of
course. The dissenting group might be only one disgruntled retail
stockholder holding a handful of shares, or it could be a group of
sophisticated institutions owning a substantial percentage of the target
firm's equity. To get a sense of the economic importance of appraisal, we
define the value of dissenters' position as the value of the merger
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consideration foregone in pursuing appraisal.35 In 2014, the amount of
aggregate equity value that dissented was 0.47% of the equity value of
all appraisal-eligible public company transactions, which represented a
decline from 2013, when approximately 1% of equity value dissented.
Between 2011 and 2014, the aggregate equity value dissenting from all
transactions was 0.36%. The comparable number for the period from
2004 through 2010 was 0.07%. Figure 3 below shows the percentage of
equity value dissenting in each year.
Figure 3
Percentage of Equity Value in Appraisal, by year, 2004-2014
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Appraisal activity is highly concentrated on a handful of
transactions. In the four-year period from 2011 to 2014, there were 434
appraisal eligible transactions, of which 39-or approximately 9%-had
more than 0.5% of equity value demand appraisal. The largest dissenting
group in this period was 25.4%. Figure 4 below shows visually how
much equity value sought appraisal for each eligible deal between 2011
and 2014. Each of the 434 transactions is represented by a single narrow
vertical bar; the portion of the bar in red represents the portion of equity
demanding appraisal. The portion in white represents the portion of
equity not demanding appraisal. The red area in the lower left-hand
corner of the figure visually represents the amount of dissenting stock.
The remaining area of the figure in white visually represents the amount
of stock that did not dissent.
"Dissenting stockholders must forego receiving the merger consideration in order to
pursue appraisal. See Korsmo & Myers, Structure of Stockholder Litigation, supra note 1, at
859.
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Figure 4
Amount of Equity Value in Appraisal, by transaction, 2011-2014
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As these figures demonstrate, even though appraisal activity has
never been higher than during this four-year period, the absolute amount
of appraisal activity is still quite small. The overwhelming majority of
transactions have no appraisal activity whatsoever. Only a
comparatively small fraction of transactions experience more than a
trivial amount of appraisal activity: Fewer than 2% of transactions faced
an appraisal group larger than 3.5% of the equity value.
The rate of appraisal challenge seems especially small in relation
to the comparable figures from merger class actions. Not only did 88%
of appraisal-eligible transactions face a fiduciary duty class action, these
suits challenged approximately 97% of the equity value of all
transactions during the period from 2011 to 2014. As discussed more
fully below, the relevant figures suggest that appraisal petitions are far
from posing an existential threat even to those suspect transactions that
are targeted, much less to the far larger universe of transactions that
never face an appraisal petition in the first place.
B. The Outcome of Appraisal Petitions
Even if appraisal petitioners are narrowly targeting the most
problematic transactions, the incidence of appraisal petitions is only one
half of the picture. The course the petitions take after filing is equally
important. Pre-trial motion practice is relatively uncommon in appraisal
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cases." There are no conventional bases for moving to dismiss an
appraisal petition or moving for summary judgment, aside from narrow
technical questions about the eligibility of particular petitioners to seek
appraisal.37  Thus, very few appraisal petitioners ever face a standard
motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.
Among merger litigation, appraisal cases are unusually likely to go
to trial. Vice Chancellor Glasscock recently described an appraisal trial
as a "common scenario in this Court. 38 Of the 100 public company
transactions challenged by a counseled common stockholder between
2004 and 2013,39 there were 16 trials, representing 16% of all
transactions challenged. The relatively high incidence of trial may be
one reason for the high public visibility of appraisal, in spite of the small
number of actual cases. Nonetheless, as in other types of stockholder
litigation settlements are still the most common outcome; 81 cases-or
81%-settled, though some of these settlements happened after trial. The
remaining cases were withdrawn or are still pending.
Merger class actions can again serve as a useful baseline for
comparison. Despite the fact that virtually every significant transaction
is challenged, trials in merger class actions are extraordinarily rare, so
rare that an analysis of trial outcomes in fiduciary class actions is
essentially meaningless because there are so few. Even in fiduciary class
actions that are tried to judgment, it may be the presence of appraisal
petitioners that leads to trial, rather than the traditional "disclosure only"
settlement.40  For example, one of the more prominent merger class
actions trials involved Dole, 41 and appraisal may here have played a role
in pushing that case to trial. The lead plaintiffs counsel in Delaware was
also counsel for appraisal petitioners with substantial holdings,42 and it
presumably would have been difficult for the class action to be settled on
mediocre terms because doing so might have prejudiced the appraisal
claimants.
36Appraisal cases are statutorily guided; therefore, if the petitioners satisfy all of the
statutory requirements, the defendants have no conventional basis for a pre-trial motion to
dismiss or motion for summary judgment. See generally 8 Del. C. § 262.37See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 WL 4313206, at *25 (Del. Ch. July 13,
2015) (granting summary judgment against several petitioners for failure to satisfy 262(a)'s
continuous ownership requirement).38Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 WL 6164771, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct.
21, 20152.9We stop our analysis here in 2013 because cases filed after that are unlikely to have
gone to trial as of the time of this writing.40See generally Cain & Solomon, supra note 28 (finding that slightly less than 80% of
merger class actions end in a settlement providing additional disclosure as the only remedy).4 1See In re Dole Food Co., Inc., Stockholder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214 (Del. Ch. Aug.
27, 2015).421d
"
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At trial, the sole merits issue is the fair value of the petitioners'
shares. 43 For both the petitioner and the respondent in an appraisal trial,
the key witness is usually the financial expert who opines on the
valuation of the firm. We collected information on the valuations offered
by these experts. For the respondents' experts, the median valuation was
16% below the merger price, and the mean was 22% below. For
petitioners' experts, the median valuation was 78% above the merger
price, and the mean was 186% above. A common lament from the
members of the Court of Chancery is that the divergent valuations
produced by the dueling experts often put them in an awkward situation
in attempting to arrive at a sensible valuation in a situation where both
parties formally share the ultimate burden of proof.44  The problem,
though, may be unavoidable. The very fact that the parties failed to
settle their claims is itself evidence that the parties' genuine beliefs on
valuation are far apart,45 so it should be no surprise that the evidence put
on at trial is consistent with that. Following trial, judicial opinions award
values that-unsurprisingly-tend to fall between the values proffered
by the petitioners' and the respondents' experts. Figure 5 shows a box
plot of the spread of valuations from respondents, judges, and petitioners.
43 Korsmo & Myers, Structure of Stockholder Litigation, supra note 1, at 866.
44See Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1,
2013)("Both parties bear the burden of establishing fair value by a preponderance of the
evidence."); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30,
2015) ("Section 262 is unusual in that it purports explicitly to allocate the burden of proof to
the petitioner and the respondent [... ]").
45See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (discussing various theories as to why some cases are
tried and others settled, as well as the relationship between cases that are litigated and cases
that are settled.).
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Figure 5
Box Plots of Trial Valuations
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On the left, in blue, is a plot of the "fair values" proffered by the
respondent, given as a multiple of the merger price; on the right, in
green, are values argued by the petiti 'oner; and in the middle, in red, are
the "fair values" as ultimately determined by the court.
The 14 trial outcomes since 2004 for public company appraisal
cases of common stock exhibit a wide spread .4  Three opinions awarded
less than the merger price, and one of those-involving common
stockholders of a firm subject to large arrearages to preferred
stockholders-the petitioners suffered a complete wipeout, with the court
holding that the common stock was worthless. At the other end of the
spectrum, the highest recovery was a 138% premium over the merger
price in Orchard Enterprises. As the box plot in Figure 5 indicates, the
measures of central tendencies, however, are clustered only slightly
above the merger price. The median recovery was 1.5% above the
merger price, and the mean recovery was 10.6%. Figure 6 shows the
trials and their outcomes .4
46 See infra Figure 6.4 7 Though technically a class action, we include the Dole Foods case in our data
because of the prominent role of the appraisal petitioners in driving the litigation, and due to
the prominent role of the Dole defendants in the campaign against appraisal arbitrage.
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Figure 6
Appraisal Trial Outcomes for Public Company Common Stock
(2004-2014)
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Two of these cases-Orchard Enterprises 48 and Hanover Direct49,
the highest and lowest recoveries-involved disputes about the value
owed to preferred stock, which may be unlike other types of appraisal
disputes, but they essentially offset such that excluding them makes little
difference to the mean or median trial outcome.
These trial results, of course, are not a random selection of
appraisal-eligible cases. Cases selected for litigation by petitioners and
the cases where petitioners are further willing to push to trial should be a
group of relatively strong cases. Not exclusively the strongest cases,
though, because in those circumstances it would be natural for
defendants to have a similar view of the likely trial outcome and attempt
to settle in advance of trial.5° Intriguingly, the most successful appraisal
trial for the petitioners-Orchard Enterprises-arguably
undercompensated the appraisal petitioners. 51 Following the appraisal
judgment, enterprising plaintiffs' attorneys reanimated the Orchard
48In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Sholder Litig., 88 A. 3d (Del. Ch. 2014).491n re Hanover Direct, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2010 WL 3959399 (Del. Ch. Sept. 24,
2010).
'OSee generally Priest & Klein, supra note 45 (discussing various theories as to why
some cases are tried and others settled, as well as the relationship between cases that are
litigated and cases that are settled.)
"I1n re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2014 WL 4248096, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 27, 2014) (Trial Order).
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fiduciary case and recovered an amount even beyond what the appraisal
trial concluded to be the fair value.52
One striking feature of the trial results is that four of the most
recent opinions-CKx, Ancestry.corn, Autoinfo, and BMC Software53 -
all awarded the petitioners the negotiated deal price. In a fifth recent
case, Ramtron,54 fair value was calculated at a small discount to the
merger price. Assuming these outcomes reflect a genuine trend, there
are at least two potential explanations for this recent lack of success by
appraisal petitioners, though they are not mutually exclusive. The first
possible explanation is that the cases themselves were not as strong as
earlier cases and that they reflect a change in petitioner behavior. All
five cases were brought during the 2011-13 period when appraisal
activity was increasing rapidly. Additionally, all five were brought by
repeat petitioners who appear to specialize in appraisal, at least to some
degree. It is entirely possible that all of these transactions delivered fair
value to stockholders and that the decision to dissent from them and
press to trial was foolhardy, reflecting a boomtown mentality. Some
specialist petitioners, in other words, may have become intoxicated by
their own marketing materials and failed to see the very large warts on
these cases, or they may have proceeded to trial despite the warts in an
effort to build or preserve reputational capital for future cases.
A second possible explanation is that these cases may represent a
message from the Delaware courts both to would-be appraisal petitioners
and to critics of appraisal. The decisions have all arrived at a time when
invective against appraisal from defense lawyers is at a fever pitch, in the
form of denunciations of appraisal specialists at corporate law panels and
55in blog postings. No doubt, these protestations over nearly every
element of the appraisal remedy might be, in part, intended to influence
the Chancery Court, much as a football coach's sideline tantrum may be
designed to influence the referees. One potential explanation-though
perhaps too cynical-is that the recent spate of defeats the Delaware
Court of Chancery has handed to appraisal petitioners was designed to
reassure the appraisal alarmists-and the legislature- that the court has
appraisal well in hand, without the need for radical legislative reforms.
521d
53See In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30,
2015); Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 WL 2069417 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015);
Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 WL 6164771 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015).54LongPath Capital, LLC v. Rantron Inter. Corp., 2015 WL 4540443 (Del. Ch. June
30, 2015).
See, e.g., Mirvis, supra note 8; Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Legislature Should Act
to Curb Appraisal Arbitrage Abuses, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG, (Feb. 10, 2015),
http://tinyurl.con/CLS-]5iil 0; Maurice Lefkort, Hedge Funds Can Still Manipulate Corporate
Law, WHARTON BLOG NETWORK, (Feb. 12, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/WBN-12iil5.
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Perhaps less cynically, this string of defeats may represent a shot across
the bow of appraisal specialists, designed to staunch a perceived gold
rush, and to remind would-be petitioners that they cannot expect a
reward above the merger price unless they can persuasively call into
question the sales process that led to that price.
To summarize the factual picture that emerges, appraisal litigation
activity in Delaware exhibits a number of distinctive features. Claims
are small in number, representing only 5% of litigation activity related to
mergers. Appraisal touches slightly more than one in eight appraisal-
eligible merger transactions, and even in this era of heightened
sensitivity to appraisal the amount of equity value demanding appraisal is
small, representing less than one-half of one percent of equity value.
Petitioners concentrate their resources on a group of transactions that
have abnormally low merger premia and are especially likely to involve
insider participation, both of which suggest a focus on the merits of the
underlying claims. Appraisal petitioners are also far more likely to fight
in court all the way to trial than other types of merger litigants.
III. THE APPRAISAL BACKLASH
In spite of the evidence suggesting that appraisal plays a beneficial
role in corporate M&A, an effort is afoot to pressure Delaware into
adopting radical changes to its appraisal statute.56 The first signals of
unrest from mergers and acquisitions advisors came following the
takeover of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. and the subsequent appraisal
proceeding-by far the largest ever to that time.57 On April 21, 2005,
Transkaryotic announced that it had agreed to merge with Shire
Pharmaceuticals for $37 per share. 58 The board approved the merger by
only a 5-2 vote, and the decision to merge prompted the Transkaryotic
CEO to resign in protest. 59  On June 20, Transkaryotic announced
extremely positive results of a Phase III clinical trial for a drug in its
pipeline.60 At a July 27 meeting, 53% of stockholders voted to approve
the merger, and the transaction closed that day.61 Stockholder dissent
56See Kazanoff & Gluckow, supra note 3 (noting that deal advisors are "waging an
escalating war" and that "the fight is likely to continue to be played out before the Delaware
Chancery and Supreme courts and in the General Assembly.').
71n re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 2007 WL 1378345, at *1 (Del. Ch.
May 2, 2007).
58Jd. at * 1.
591n re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 355 (Del. Ch. 2008)60id.61d
6'In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 2007 WL 1378345, at *1 (Del. Ch.
May 11, 2016).
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had been growing since the announcement of the positive clinical trial
results, and various hedge funds began amassing large amounts of stock
with the intention of demanding appraisal. By the close of the
transaction, about one-third of Transkaryotic's stockholders had dissented
and demanded appraisal.62
Shire attempted to kick some of the shares out of the appraisal
proceeding on the ground that they had been acquired too late.63 The
record date for voting in the Transkaryotic stockholder meeting was June
10, 2005, and Delaware law conditions appraisal eligibility on the record
64owner not having voted for the merger. For most publicly traded stock,
the record owner is a depository trust such as Cede & Co., 65 with
purchases and sales on public exchanges merely altering the beneficial
ownership of the relevant shares. Shire argued that the stock that the
petitioners beneficially acquired after the record date was not eligible for
appraisal unless they could demonstrate that such stock had not been
voted in favor of the merger-an impossible requirement, given the way
stock most is held by depository trusts in fungible bulk.66 Prior Delaware
precedent already made clear that stock over which beneficial ownership
was acquired after the record date is eligible for appraisal, 67 and that this
reality was well-understood by market participants.68  Chancellor
Chandler confirmed this understanding in a letter opinion denying Shire's
69
motion.
62id.
63id.
64See 8 Del. C. § 262(a).
65For a detailed background on Cede & Co., see Vice Chancellor Laster's scholarly
opinion inIn re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 WL 4313206 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2015).
66Id. (explaining how stock is held in fungible bulk).
67Olivetti Underwood Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co., 217 A.2d 683, 686-87 (Del. 1966).68See Elena Berton, Hedge Funds Vex A Shire Takeover Of Transkaryotic, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 17, 2005), http://tinyurl.com/WSJ-17viiiO5 ("Delaware corporate law allows all
shareholders -- even those who bought shares just before the vote on a takeover -- to seek an
independent valuation in court if they reckon the price being offered for their stock is
inadequate, even if a majority approve the takeover."). By contrast, defense lawyers often
paint the Transkaryotic ruling as a surprise. See Norwitz, supra note 55 ("Before
Transkaryotic, it was generally understood that only shareholders who owned shares on the
record date for the vote on the transaction could dissent and seek judicial appraisal of their
shares.").69See In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3 (Del. Ch.
May 2, 2007) ("The question presented in this case can be stated thusly: Must a beneficial
shareholder, who purchased shares after the record date but before the merger vote, prove, by
documentation, that each newly acquired share (i.e., after the record date) is a share not voted
in favor of the merger by the previous beneficial shareholder? The answer seems simple. No.
Under the literal terms of the statutory text and under longstanding Delaware Supreme Court
precedent, only a record holder, as defined in the DGCL, may claim and perfect appraisal
rights. Thus, it necessarily follows that the record holder's actions determine perfection of the
right to seek appraisal.").
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Although the Chancellor's opinion only confirmed precedent that
was half a century old,7° the Transkaryotic ruling soon loomed large in
the minds of defense counsel. According to one prominent defense-side
law firm, the decision held the "potential to revolutionize the use of
appraisal rights" and "heralds a major new chapter in the appraisal rights
remedy. 7 1 Despite the precedent affirming the point before and since
Transkaryotic, defense lawyers claimed to be surprised by it.72 In the
wake of the Transkaryotic decision, legal scholars took note of the ruling
and associated hedge fund use of appraisal, exploring its implications.73
George Geis, for example, suggested that in the wake of Transkaryotic
"it is possible that a robust market for appraisal rights will develop,
analogous to the market for corporate control that allegedly disciplines
otherwise entrenched managers with the threat of an external takeover.
7 4
In the early years following the decision, however, very little changed in
appraisal activity. The defense-side dystopia that some envisioned in the
wake of the Transkaryotic ruling did not come to pass, and little attention
was paid to the strategy. As the Figures in the preceding section reveal,
there was no discernable increase in the incidence of appraisal through
2007 and 2008.
Meanwhile, the Transkaryotic litigation itself chugged along. At
the commencement of the litigation, hedge fund analysts had floated
$45-50 valuations for Transkaryotic after factoring in the positive
clinical trial results.75 Stock analysts at Lehman Brothers covering Shire,
however, estimated that the liability in the appraisal proceeding would be
76
somewhere between $1.00 and $5.00 per share. On November 5, 2008,
7 0Olivetti Underwood Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co., 217 A.2d at 686 ("[T]here is no
recognizable stockowner under the merger-appraisal provisions of our Corporation Law except
a registered stockholder.")
71Latham & Watkins LLP M&A Deal Commentary, Appraisal Arbitrage: Will It
Become A New Hedge Fund Strategy?, (May 2007) availabe at http://tinyurl.com/HLS-25v07.72Bomba et al., supra note 14, at 2 (describing opinion as "against expectations");
Latham & Watkins LLP, supra note 71 (suggesting a "common assumption that only
beneficial owners on the record date who issued appropriate no vote instructions to the record
holder would be able to establish eligibility for appraisal").
73George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1638 (2011); See
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1038-39 (2007) (suggesting that "[w]hen hedge funds are
dissatisfied with the terms of an acquisition and unable to obtain better terms, they also resort
to litigation" and giving examples, including appraisal as a last resort).
74Geis, supra note 73, at 1638.75See generally Berton, supra 68 ("The takeover of Transkaryotic was announced
before the final test results for 12S were released. The results turned out to be very positive and
suggested 2S was capable of fetching annual sales of $200 million, according to analysts. This
led some Transkaryotic shareholders to question Shire's offer, arguing that their shares could
be valued at as much as $45 to $50 each.").761d.
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Shire announced that it had settled the appraisal claims. Shire disclosed
that it agreed to pay "the same price of $37 per share originally offered to
all [Transkaryotic] shareholders at the time of the July 2005 merger, plus
interest.77 There were 11.3 million shares that had demanded appraisal,
and they received "total payment of $567.5 million, representing
consideration at $37 per share of $419.9 million and an interest cost of
$147.6 million. 7 8 This account of the settlement-that Shire settled for
the original $37 merger price-has been repeated in practitioner and
academic commentary alike.79
On closer scrutiny, however, a different picture emerges. As
noted, when it announced the settlement in November 2008, Shire
80claimed it was paying over $147.6 million in interest. In the
immediately prior quarter, however, the company had projected a
potential liability for interest in the appraisal litigation that was less than
half that amount. 81  The increased amount of "interest" makes sense,
however, when broken down by the number of dissenting shares; the
$147.6 million works out to precisely $13 per share. The petitioners, in
other words, settled for $50 per share, although Shire worked hard to
make the settlement appear as though there was no premium to the
merger price.82  This result-known to the many sophisticated entities
that pursued appraisal rights in Transkaryotic-was no doubt a key
reason the case generated interest in pursuing appraisal as an investment
strategy.
77Shire PLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 57 (Dec. 31, 2009).78 Id.
79Geis, supra note 73, at 1639-40 ("[D]espite the favorable summary judgment ruling,
petitioners in Transkaryotic eventually settled their claim for the initial $37 merger
consideration (plus interest), thereby throwing their claims of purported price inadequacy into
question.");
8°Shire PLC, supra note 77, at 38.
81See Shire PLC, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 24 (Aug. 4, 2008), at 24 ("At June
30, 2008 the Company recorded a liability of $419.9 million based on the merger consideration
of $37 per share for the 11.3 million shares outstanding at that time plus a provision for
interest of $70.6 million that may be awarded by the Court.").82See Shire PLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2009) ("Upon reaching
agreement in principle with all the dissenting shareholders, the Company determined that
settlement had become the probable manner through which the appraisal rights litigation
would be resolved. Under current law, (although not applicable in this case because the merger
was entered into before the relevant amendment to the law became effective) the court
presumptively awards interest in appraisal rights cases at a statutory rate that is 5 percentage
points above the Federal Reserve discount rate (as it varies over the duration of the case). In
connection with the settlement, the Company agreed to an interest rate that approximates to
this statutory rate. Based on the settlement, the Company amended the method of determining
its interest provision to reflect this revised manner of resolution, and recorded additional
interest expense of $73.0 million in its consolidated financial statements for the year to
December 31, 2008 on reaching settlement with the dissenting shareholders.").
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In 2010, new and more sophisticated petitioners began to crop up,
although general appraisal patterns did not yet change in any externally
obvious way.83 In May, an entity called Merion Capital filed its first
petition, challenging the takeover of Airvana, Inc. 4 Merion, as well as
another investment firm that dissented in Airvana, Magnetar Capital,
would come to be among the most active appraisal petitioners in terms of
dollars at stake.85 Merlin Partners, an affiliate of the Cleveland-based
investment firm Ancora Advisors that had participated in its first
appraisal case in mid-2006, also began filing appraisal petitions in its
own name in 2010.86 Merion is reputed to have raised capital devoted
solely to the strategy of pursuing appraisal rights, and Merion's
investments in some targets were so large that it crossed the 5%
threshold, triggering SEC filing requirements; 87  Merion appears to
invest in target companies exclusively after the announcement of a deal,
with all Merion purchases of target stock disclosed on the relevant Form
13Gs occurring after the announcement of the merger transaction.
Another large repeat petitioner is Verition Capital, a multi-strategy fund
based in Greenwich, Connecticut. 8 Verition, Magnetar and Merlin all
appear committed to appraisal as an investment strategy, making and
dissenting on numerous large positions in target companies.
In spite of the increasing sophistication of appraisal petitioners-
and the slight increase in the percentage of transactions facing an
appraisal petition-the strategy did not attract much media attention
until, in early 2013, two large going-private transactions put appraisal
back on the map. Michael Dell's effort to acquire Dell Inc. sparked a
number of protests from stockholders, with perhaps the most influential
of them coming from Carl Icahn. 9 Icahn was displeased with the deal
and publicly threatened that he was going to exercise his appraisal rights
in the absence of a price increase.90 This was not Icahn's first foray into
3See Abigail Pickering Bomba et al., Fried Frank discusses Delaware Appraisal
Arbitrage as a New Activist Weapon, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL: THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(July 9, 2014), http://tinyurl.com/CLS-09viil4.84See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Fine Legal Point Poses Challenge to Appraisal
Rights, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 30, 2014), http://tinyurl.com/NYT-30vl4.
85See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of
Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1574 (2015).86Miles Weiss, Dell Value Dispute Spotlights Rise in Appraisal Arbitrage,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2013), http://tinyurl.com/BLP-03xl3;
7See, e.g., Lender Processing Servs., (Schedule 13G), at 2 (Dec. 9, 2013) (declaring
Merion Capital's ownership in the company to be 6%); See, e.g., Deltek, Inc., (Schedule 13G),
at 2 (Sept. 25, 2012) (declaring Merion Capital's ownership in the company to be 6.3%).
88See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 85, at 1574.
89See Weiss, supra note 86.
9 0See id; See Michael J. de la Merced, Icahn's Latest Gamble at Dell: Appraisal
Rights, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 10, 2013), http://tinyurl.com/NYT-10viil3.
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appraisal: he was a large part of the dissenting group in Transkaryotic. 91
In response, Dell Inc. formed a special committee, and their counsel has
since explained that Icahn's threat to dissent from the transaction
prompted the merger parties to increase the merger consideration by
$400 million.92 In addition to getting the board's attention, Icahn's saber-
rattling attracted attention in the New York Times, the Wall Street
Journal, and other publications.93
The late-2013 privatization of Dole Food also gave discontented
stockholders an opportunity to demand appraisal, and many did. The
offer to acquire Dole came from the company's controlling stockholder,
who simultaneously indicated he would not sell his stake to anyone
else.94 Despite investor unrest over the price, the ultimately successful
bid was not subject to any competitive pressure, and approximately 19%
of Dole stockholders ended up dissenting from the transaction. 95 The
first appraisal petition was filed in mid-November of 2013.96
It was, in fact, the Dole litigation that appears to have led to the
initial effort to alter Delaware's appraisal statute. The push by Dole
management to change Delaware's appraisal statute began in late 2013,
only a few weeks after the first appraisal petition was filed in the Dole
case.97 The company's assistant corporate secretary contacted staff in the
Delaware Governor's office, and the governor's office emailed the CEO
of Dole the list of the membership on Delaware's influential Corporation
Law Council-the body of the Delaware bar that proposes amendments
to the DGCL-and indicating a willingness to discuss "next steps." 98 In
early 2014, Dole and representatives of the governor's office scheduled a
conference call to discuss two seemingly unrelated topics: Dole's
operations in the Port of Wilmington and the variable interest rate
91See Geis, supra note 73, at 1638-39.
92See Bomba et al, supra note 83.
93See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced, Filing Shows Twisting Path To Three-Way Racefor Dell, N.Y. TIES, (Mar. 29, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/the-path-to-
a-three-way-race-for-dell/; Ronald Barusch, Is Dell Headed for Record-Breaking Delaware
Appraisal Case?, WALL ST. J.: DEALPOLITIK (Feb. 11, 2013), http://tinyurl.com/WSJ-1 liil3.94See In re Dole Food Co., S'holder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, at *22 (Del. Ch. Aug.
27, 2015) (stating that Dole CEO David Murdock "was only a buyer, not a seller").95See In re Dole Food Co., S'holder Litig., 2014 WL 3002551, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. July
1, 2014)glOpening Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification).
See In re Dole Food Co., S'holder Litig., 2014 WL 6488468 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13,
2013) (Trial Motion).
97Tom Hals, America's oldest CEO puts his Dole buyout to a high-stakes test,
REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/R-Dole-14viiil5.
9' Email on file with authors, obtained through FOIA request. The Council is the
entity that generates proposed amendments to Delaware's corporate statute. See Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749,
1754-57 (2006) (describing the functions of the Council).
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payable to appraisal petitioners.99 In addition to being a defendant in one
of the largest appraisal cases in Delaware, Dole-an importer of fruits
and vegetables-was also the biggest tenant in the Port of Wilmington.
According to news reports, Dole was attempting to use its leverage as a
large employer in Delaware to force changes in the state's appraisal
statute. 00
By early summer, the appraisal issue had somehow seeped into the
unrelated debate over fee-shifting bylaws in the wake of the ATP Tour,
Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund decision.101 Delaware's Council had
recommended a legislative change that would prohibit such bylaws. 102 C.
Michael Carter, Dole's CEO, sent a letter to Delaware legislators
attempting to tie fee-shifting bylaws to appraisal: "In Dole's view, the
proposed legislation is anti-business and will only serve to encourage the
appraisal arbitrage lawsuits that have become so commonplace against
companies in Delaware." 10 3 The puzzling joining of otherwise-unrelated
issues makes sense only in light of the potential liabilities facing Dole.
The fee-shifting legislative amendment stalled that spring, and the
legislature passed a joint resolution calling on the Council to examine the
fee-shifting issue in the coming year.104 But the resolution also included
something else: a sentence requesting that the Council also examine "the
operation and administration of the statutes and court rules governing the
exercise of appraisal rights; and the rate of interest on any fair value
determination in an appraisal."10 5  By fall, Dole's demands on the
governor's office had become explicit, and it was directly threatening to
reincorporate elsewhere and encourage others to follow. 10 6  Dole
representatives spoke directly with the Delaware Secretary of State, in
99 Email on file with authors, obtained through FOIA request.
'
00See Jonathan Starkey, Dole pressures Delaware on corporate law changes,
DELAWAREONLINE: THE NEWS JOURNAL (Mar. 12, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/DNJ-1 liiil5.
10191 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).102Gregory DiCiancia, Limiting Frivolous Shareholder Lawsuits Via Fee-Shifting
Bylaws: A Call for Delaware to Overturn and Revise lts Fee-Shifting Bylaw Statute, 56 B.C.L.
REv. 1537, 1562 (2015).
103Letter from C. Michael Carter to Sen. Bryan Townsend, June 9, 2014, on file with
authors.
114See Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39
DEL. J. CORP. L. 751, 767 (2015) (describing the fate of the amendment).
'°SS.J. Res. 12, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014).106Email from Genevieve Kelly to Michael Barlow, Sept. 22, 2014 (on file with
authors) ("Dole believes change in Delaware's appraisal statute is urgently needed, both in the
interest provision and in the provision describing when a stockholder has appraisal rights (we
believe a stockholder who buys stock after the announcement of a transaction is just buying a
lawsuit and should not have appraisal rights.) [A panel on appraisal investing that included a
prominent plaintiffs' attorney] show companies why there is a need to re-incorporated in more
business friendly states").
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addition to the governor's staff, and the message was that C. Michael
Carter and David Murdock "remain very focused on the need for change
in Delaware's appraisal rights law."'10 7
Meanwhile, the defense bar complemented Dole's efforts by
issuing public commentary sounding ominous notes about appraisal. 10 8
A prominent New York-based corporate litigator, for example, described
a "troubling expansion of stockholder appraisal rights."' 1 9 One law firm
memo worried about the "risky business of valuation in Delaware
courts," suggesting that the "wide latitude" that courts had in valuing the
cashed-out stock can rely on "unrealistic" financial projections. 110 A
blog post by a Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, and Katz transactional advisor
claimed there was an "urgent need for legislative reform in Delaware to
ameliorate the risk that appraisal arbitrage-now a multibillion dollar
industry-poses to transactional vitality and shareholder value.""'1  The
general tenor of these commentaries was one of a clear and present threat
to the merger market.' At least one intended audience must have been
Delaware's blue-ribbon Council on Corporation Law, which was
examining potential reforms to the appraisal statute at that time.1 The
image that emerged, kaleidoscopically, from these various defense-side
commentaries was of a threat to merger activity, a potential price
reaction by acquirers, and the re-emergence of appraisal closing
conditions in merger agreements. The mechanisms through which
107Email from Genevieve Kelly to Michael Barlow, Sept. 25, 2014 (on file with
authors).
108 See Letkort, supra note 55 (claiming that the appraisal rights "are being
manipulated by sophisticated market players to reap above-market, low-risk returns in a
practice known as 'Appraisal Arbitrage"' and that "[a]llowing this practice to continue will
come at the expense of the stockholders who are not manipulating these rules, and at the
efficiency of the mergers and acquisitions marketplace"); The Growth of Appraisal Litigation
in Delaware, WSGR ALERT (Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, Profl Org., Palo Alto,
Cal.), Nov. 2013, at 1 ("Less noticed [than the rise in merger class actions], but perhaps more
significant, has been the growing tendency of institutional and other large investors to exercise
their appraisal rights under Delaware law").
109Mirvis, supra note 8.10 The Growth of Appraisal Litigation in Delaware, supra note 10, at 1-2.
1 'Norwitz, supra note 55.
112Id. ("Commentators have been warning for years of the dangers of appraisal
arbitrage, including increasing complexity of and risk to transactions, and diversion of value
from the general body of shareholders to small groups of appraisal 'raiders."').13 In some ways, this represents the system working well. The Council is the body
that collects potential reforms to the DGCL and evaluates their desirability, and one way they
get suggestions is from counsel outside Delaware. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Policy
Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1749, 1756 (2006) ("Council
members not uncommonly receive suggestions for change from clients or co-counsel outside
of Delaware [...]").
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appraisal would generate these dire results was assumed without ever
really being explained.
In the early spring of 2015, the Delaware Council issued its long-
awaited set of reforms. There were two reforms that addressed
appraisal.11 4 One would introduce an option for the respondent company
to pay over some amount to the petitioner after the deal closing to stop
the running of interest 15; the second would deny appraisal rights in a
transaction unless the dissenting group exceeded a de minimis
requirement: either more than 1% of the company or more than $1
million in value at the merger price.11 6 These two reforms were designed
to fix specific shortcomings in the appraisal process. The interest
payment proposal would at least ensure that respondent companies were
not forced to unwillingly borrow money from the petitioners at more
than they were willing to pay. And the de minimis requirement
foreclosed the unwelcome possibility that a small stockholder could try
to force a settlement for the nuisance value of the claims. Despite also
calling for more radical reform, one prominent law firm issued a
memorandum that explained how the Council's reforms would have
precisely the right incentive effects on appraisal claims: encouraging
strong cases and discouraging weak ones.117
In addition to these incremental reforms, the Council also
considered the more radical proposals offered by Dole and the defense-
side New York firms. In light of the evidence indicating that appraisal
claims were uncommon, and were focused on claims with strong
evidence of merit, the Council very sensibly declined to recommend
them.1 8 The Council's proposed reforms are generally adopted by the
legislature as a matter of course, 119 but defense-side firms declined to
embrace the measured amendments proposed by the Council, describing
J4Jiang, supra note 7.
1161d.
'
17See Abigail Pickering Bomba et al., FRIED FRANK M&A BRIEFING: PROPOSED
APPRAISAL STATUTE AMENDMENTS WOULD PERMIT COMPANIES TO REDUCE THEIR
INTEREST COST-LIKELY TO DISCOURAGE 'WEAKER' APPRAISAL CLAIMS AND MAKE
SETTLEMENT OF 'STRONGER' CLAIMS HARDER (2015).
'See Lowenstein Sandier, EXPLANATORY PAPER FOR SECTION 262 APPRAISAL
AMENDMENTS 1-3 (2015), available at http://tinyurl.com/jnz8puc (noting that "[t]he
subcommittee initially considered whether to modify Section 262 to eliminate or limit
appraisal arbitrage" but concluded that it should not and listing reasons).
"
9Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1600 (2005) ("Delaware's legislature then typically
adopts the proposed amendments. Neither a legislative committee nor the legislature as a body
changes the proposal or debates its merits, and the vote on the proposed amendment tends to
be unanimous.").
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them as inadequate."' One firm issued a client note painting a bleak
picture: "Failure to adequately address the rising trend of appraisal
arbitrage risks creating incentives for buyers to lower their price in
anticipation of having to pay appraisal arbitragers post-closing and
therefore shifting value away from long-term stockholders towards short-
term arbitragers without advancing the underlying public policy rationale
for appraisal rights."'
121
A group of seven law firms took the unusual step of writing a
letter directly to the Council to protest that it had failed to propose more
radical reforms to the appraisal statute.122  The seven firms stated goal
was more aggressive amendments that would ensure that "appraisal
arbitrage will be eliminated.0 23 The law firms offered what has become
the standard proposal from defense lawyers: "amend the statute to make
express that appraisal rights are not available to shareholders with no
right to vote on-and therefore dissent from-the transaction."'1 24 While
the letter gestured toward an assortment of possible arguments in favor
of such an amendment,1 25 but did not detail them with any rigor. The law
firms themselves, of course, are enormously influential in Delaware; it is
these New York firms that often select Delaware counsel, and staying in
the good graces of these firms is understandably crucial to the
livelihoods of many Delaware lawyers.
12°Dufner et al., supra note 7, at 2 ("[The 2015 Council legislative reforms] have been
criticized as insufficient to effectively address the problems of appraisal arbitrage."); Bomba et
al., supra note 117, at 5-6 ("The Amendments do not include any of the more far-reaching
changes that have been advocated by companies and others seeking to limit the volume of
appraisal claims and the prevalence of appraisal arbitrage, or to ameliorate the burden on the
court of determining "fair value", such as: a limitation on the types of transactions to which
appraisal rights would be applicable; restrictions on the timing for filing an appraisal petition;
a change in the definition of fair value; limiting appraisal rights to stockholders who owned
their shares before announcement of the merger; further requirements with respect to
establishing that shares have not been voted in favor of the merger; or establishing a burden of
proof on the parties (rather than the Chancery Court) to determine fair value.").
'Dufner et al., supra note 7, at 2.
1Letter to the Council of the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware State Bar
Association from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Latham &
Watkins LLP, Skadden, Arps, Slate Meagher & Flom LLP, Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, and Katz, dated Apr. 1, 2015, at 1(hereinafter "Letter from Seven Firms") ("In our view, the proposed legislation does not
adequately respond to the current circumstance in which decisions of the Delaware courts have
opened the door to what has come to be called 'appraisal arbitrage').
1231d. at 2.
1
24
1d.
1251d at 3 (arguing that the firms' approach would "reduce the unseemly claims-buying
that is rampant and serves no legitimate purpose, but threatens to undermine transactional
certainty and reduce value to shareholders of Delaware corporations as acquirers, particularly
in leveraged transactions, may be forced to factor the enhanced appraisal risk into their
calculations").
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At the same time, Dole continued to engage in a lobbying effort to
introduce an alternative slate of legislative amendments. The Dole
amendments went farther than those suggested by the law firms, and
would have, among other things, deprived stockholders of appraisal
rights where their shares were "purchased after public announcement of
the terms of the merger or consolidation., 126 In an unusual turn, the
amendments proposed by the Council were never introduced in the
Delaware legislature. Dole's amendments were never introduced either.
By the close of the legislative session in 2015, in fact, nothing had
changed on appraisal despite the surrounding controversy. The
expectation appeared to be that the Council would return to the drawing
board and revisit the issue of how, if at all, to change its appraisal statute
in 2016.127
In a striking coda to this spate of lobbying by Dole, Vice
Chancellor Laster issued his ruling in the Dole class action in August
2015.128 He found that David Murdock and C. Michael Carter had
engaged in a pattern of fraud, attempting to mislead stockholders and
other directors about the value of Dole. 129 The opinion held Murdock
and Carter liable for $148 million in damages, or about $2.47 per share,
on top of the $13.50 merger consideration. 130 The irony of the outcome
is that Laster declined to issue a ruling in the appraisal suit, suggesting
instead that the classwide damages might render the appraisal
proceedings moot. 131 As a result, Dole's involvement in the lobbying
effort against appraisal understandably fizzled. In 2016, the Council re-
introduced the same two amendments as the previous year.132 Without
Dole's involvement, reaction was far more muted and the amendments
were ultimately enacted by the legislature in 2016.133 Nevertheless, the
Council may still revisit alterations to the appraisal statute in the future
and grapple with the demands of the New York deal lawyers.
126Draft Legislation (on file with authors).
127Liz Hoffman, Dole and Other Companies Sour on Delaware as Corporate Haven,
WALL ST. J., (Aug. 2, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/WSJ-02viiil5 ("The bill [drafted by Dole] was
never introduced, although lawmakers have promised to consider the measure next year.").
1281n re Dole Food Co., Inc., Sholder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27,2015). 1291d. at *2-3.
130Id. at *2.
131 d. at *3. ("In addition to the plenary litigation, holders of 17,287,784 shares sought
appraisal. This decision likely renders the appraisal proceeding moot. The parties will confer
on this issue and inform the court of their views.").
132See generally Greene, supra note 19.
13 31d
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IV. EVALUATING THE NASCENT CRITIQUE OF APPRAISAL
The attack on appraisal maintained by its public critics has not, to
this point, consisted of a sustained analysis of the remedy, though of
course that may come in due time. The sole white paper that advances
arguments on behalf of the deal lawyers' favored amendment
misunderstands the deterrence role of appraisal and inadvertently
highlights the folly of the deal lawyers' favored amendment.' 34 Aside
from that paper, to call the discussion of appraisal a debate would be to
mischaracterize it. The policy arguments against appraisal have thus far
been mostly implied by rather overstated rhetoric, rather than made
explicitly through analysis and reference to empirical evidence.
In light of our empirical findings, the most appropriate reforms
to the appraisal statute in Delaware would be ones that increase the
availability of appraisal. As the evidence reported in the first Part shows,
the appraisal remedy is invoked infrequently, appraisal petitions are
associated with merits-related factors, and the outcome of appraisal
petitions do not suggest a serious problem with the system or a threat to
merger activity. In these respects, appraisal stands as the polar opposite
of the system of fiduciary class actions. Commentators should be
lauding appraisal and exploring ways to expand its reach and impact,
instead of seeking to undermine the remedy, as detailed in the prior Part.
Given the seriousness of the reforms that the critics propose,
however, it is vitally important to evaluate any potential arguments that
might be made in their favor. It is possible to construct, from a mosaic
of sources, what the stronger arguments against appraisal might be. In
this Part, we do our best to formulate and evaluate such arguments. In
sum, we find that none of the arguments advanced (or implied) by critics
of appraisal can withstand serious scrutiny. They are unsupported by the
data, often self-contradicting or otherwise illogical, and frequently boil
down to an inchoate sense that there is something gross about buying
stock for the purpose of bringing a lawsuit. We begin, in Parts III.A. and
III.B., by addressing two arguments that we regard as fundamentally
unserious, but which are raised so frequently that they ought to be
addressed, if only in the spirit of clearing away the underbrush.
A. Investing in a Lawsuit is Icky
As discussed above, many appraisal petitioners are specialists who
generally have no holdings in the target company at the time of the
134See generally Guarav Jetley & Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage-Is There a Delaware
Advantage, 71 BUS. L. 2 (2016).
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announcement of a transaction, or even at the time the company issues its
proxy statement or other disclosure documents to its stockholders. These
specialists acquire the stock with the expectation of bringing an appraisal
petition. The stock they acquire will have its appraisal rights triggered
by the announced transaction. Such specialist petitioners-appraisal
arbitrageurs, as they are sometimes called-now own the bulk of stock
involved in appraisal proceedings. 135  One basic supposition that
undergirds criticism of appraisal is that it there is something improper or
unseemly about buying a lawsuit in this way. 136  A related argument is
that stockholders should be estopped from demanding appraisal for any
stock acquired after the announcement of the merger terms because the137
stock was purchased with full knowledge of the merger and its terms.
This reaction to claim alienation certainly has deep common law
roots, 138 but it represents an attitude that is out of touch with reality and
long out of date. In modem society, the buying and selling of legal
claims is entirely commonplace, and it should not be regarded as
alarming or undesirable in its own right. Examples of claim transfer and
aggregation are legion. 139  Contract claims are often freely assignable.
Legal claims held by corporations are routinely acquired via merger, and
often form an important part of the economic value in a transaction.
Personal injury and other claims can effectively be transferred to an
insurance company via subrogation or assignment. Legal claims are
often purchased out of bankruptcy by specialist funds. The ability to
recover on shareholder claims via derivative suit or corporate class action
typically transfers with the shares. Claims appurtenant to property, such
as real estate or patents, can often be transferred with the property. Most
ubiquitously, at least a portion of almost all legal claims is effectively
13See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 1572-76.
136Letter from Seven Firms, supra note 122, at 3 (decrying "unseemly claims-buying
that is rampant and serves no legitimate. . . purpose").
13Dole advanced precisely this argument: that stockholders who acquired stock after
the announcement of a merger should be estopped from demanding appraisal because they
"purchased all of their appraisal shares with full knowledge of the [m]erger" -including the
[mlerger price and other terms-from which they now seek relief Respondent's Brief in
Support of Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal at 3, In re Appraisal of Dole Food
Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541 (Del. Ch. 2014) . Vice Chancellor Laster concluded that this would
"override the plain language of the statute." Telephonic Rulings of the Court, Transcript at 34,
In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541 (Del. Ch. 2014).38Champerty and maintenance have historically stood as bars to selling choses in
action. See WrLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. BOOK THE
FOURTH 133-35 (A. Strahan &W. Woodall, 11 1791).
9See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition: Replacing
Class Actions with a Market For Legal Claims, 101 IOWA L. REv. 1323, 1345 (2016)
[hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition]; See Michael Abramowicz, On the
Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 677-701 (2005).
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sold to attorneys as a contingency fee. Increasingly, portions of claims
are being sold to specialized litigation finance firms, as well.1 40 In many,
if not most of these everyday scenarios, the driving economic logic is the
same: the transfer of claims to parties who-via greater expertise,
economies of scale, ability to diversify away risk, etc.-can vindicate the
underlying legal rights more effectively and thus make the claims more
valuable, benefiting the claim-seller and purchaser alike.1 4 1
Appraisal is no different. If Stockholder A has a right to bring an
appraisal petition by virtue of her stock ownership, there is nothing
unusual or repugnant about empowering her to alienate the appraisal
right along with the stock. There may of course be some other good
reason to deprive Stockholder A of the ability to exercise the appraisal
right in the first place, but the fact of sale simply has no bearing on what
legal remedies to afford in a particular situation. Unless the appraisal
right itself is substantively undesirable, the mere fact that it has been
transferred to someone better able to vindicate the right does not
constitute an argument against its vindication.
B. Modern Appraisal is an Adulteration of "Real Appraisal"
A related type of argument sometimes leveled against appraisal is
that the modern form of appraisal litigation fails to serve some historic
policy rationale of appraisal. 142 The practice, in other words, is at odds
with the intent of the remedy. A claim from a deal lawyer at Wachtell is
representative: "Appraisal rights . . . were designed to provide a safety
valve for shareholders of an acquired company who are dissatisfied with
the consideration they are to receive, by allowing them to seek a judicial
determination of the 'fair value' of their shares." 143 "The remedy was not
designed to create a new way for short-term speculators to game the
system and profit at the expense of the broader shareholder body. 14 In
some ways, this line of argument simply collapses into the "claims-
selling-is-icky" argument. If it is consistent with the "purpose" of the
appraisal remedy that a stockholder can avail herself of the appraisal
140See, e.g., Jonathan A. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural
Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 103 (2010); See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is This Anyway? Third
Party Litigation Financing, 95 MINN. L. REv. 1268, 1276 (2011).
See Korsmo & Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition, supra note 139, at 1353-55.
142Dufner et al., supra note 7, at 2 ("[T]he proposed reforms have been criticized for
failing to address the disconnect between the public policy objective of appraisal rights as a
dissenters' remedy and the Chancery Court's willingness to forego any requirement that the
stockholders seeking an appraisal award actually oppose the takeover in a stockholders' vote or
have a longer-term investment horizon.").
1'4 Norwitz, supra note 55.
1441d.
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remedy, there is no reason why that same purpose should not be served
by the transferee stockholder seeking appraisal in the same situation.
Moreover, a principal goal-perhaps the principal goal-of any system
of private stockholder litigation is deterrence, and from that point of view
the identity of the plaintiff does not matter at all, so long as the claim is
brought in the right circumstances.
145
The argument that appraisal specialists are acting in ways
inconsistent with the appraisal statute has things precisely backwards.
As one prominent commentator recently noted, the available evidence on
appraisal-that petitioners are selective in targeting mergers with low
premia-shows that "[a]ppraisal rights . . . are being deployed in
accordance with their purpose." 
146
C. Appraisal Only Benefits Dissenting Stockholders
One of the most common and superficially plausible criticisms of
appraisal arbitrage-that the benefits of appraisal are captured entirely
by specialist investors and not shared with stockholders as a group 7 -is
thoroughly misguided. It ignores the fact that arbitrageurs must acquire
their shares in the first place in what will typically be an informationally-
efficient market. 148 If appraisal claims were limited to stockholders on
the announcement date of the relevant transaction, the vindication of
appraisal rights would depend on the serendipitous presence of a large,
sophisticated stockholder, and small holders would typically be unable to
benefit from their appraisal rights at all, except perhaps via deterrence.
Ironically, if the critics of appraisal arbitrage were successful in
eliminating it, they would transform appraisal into the very thing they
decry: a system where only large, sophisticated investors benefit directly,
while small investors are left out in the cold. It is precisely through the
145See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 219 (1983) ("The
conventional theory of the private attorney general stresses that the role of private litigation is
not simply to secure compensation for victims, but is at least equally to generate deterrence,
principally by multiplying the total resources committed to the detection and prosecution of
the prohibited behavior.").146Bill Bratton, Appraisal Arbitrage, JOTWELL (Nov. 25, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/J-
25xi15 (reviewing Korsmo & Myers, AppraisalArbitrage, supra note 1).147See Norwitz, supra note 55, at 2.148As Judge Easterbrook has noted, "few propositions in economics are better
established than the quick adjustment of securities prices to public information." West v.
Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) (In this context, the availability of
appraisal rights is itself public information and, in a competitive market, the value of such
rights will be reflected in trading prices).
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ability to sell their shares to an appraisal specialist that the typical
investor can share directly in the benefits of appraisal.
Furthermore, like any other participant in a diversified economy of
specialists, the original holders of legal claims share in the increased
value created by aggregating specialists. 149 As the appraisal market
matures, we expect specialists to bid the post-announcement price of
target shares up to the present expected value of the appraisal claim.
And indeed, post-announcement trading above the merger price is
evident in a number of transactions that ultimately faced appraisal
petitions. 150
Perhaps more importantly, appraisal-like many other forms of
private litigation-can benefit stockholders in at least two ways: through
compensation or through deterrence. Even where non-dissenters do not
share directly in compensation, they share in the benefits of deterrence.
As noted above, the threat of appraisal can help deter opportunistic
transactions. To name but a single obvious example, Carl Icahn's threat
to pursue his appraisal rights against Dell generated an additional $400
million in value for minority stockholders.15 '
D. Only Beneficial Holders on the Record Date
Should be Eligible for Appraisal
Another misguided but common proposal is to limit appraisal to
holders of stock on the record date for the shareholder vote on a
transaction, reversing the holding of long line of Delaware case law. 152 It
is often claimed that doing so would eliminate an unfair advantage for
appraisal specialists-a "free option" to wait and see if positive
developments following the record date but before the closing date lead
to an increased estimate of fair value. 53 If developments are negative,
149See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 139, at 736; Korsmo & Myers, Aggregation by
Acquisition, supra note 139, at 1363 (explaining why "[i]n a competitive market, the seller [of
a legal claim] will receive the bulk of the additional value that a claim provides to an
aggregator.").
130See Wei Jiang, Tao Li, & Danqing Mei, Influencing Control: Jawboning in Risk
Arbitrage, at 4, 7 (COLUM. Bus. SCH., Research, Working Paper No. 15-41, 2016).
151See Bomba et al., supra note 14, at 3 ("In the Dell going private transaction, for
example, the threat by Carl Icahn and others to seek appraisal of the shares they had amassed
after announcement of the deal effectively blocked the required shareholder vote (a majority of
the minority shares outstanding) and led to a $400 million increase in the merger price paid to
shareholders (as recently discussed publicly by legal counsel to the Dell special committee).").
152See Norwitz, supra note 55, at 2-3; Salomon Bros. Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp.,
576 A.2d 650, 652 (Del. Ch. 1989)
153See Jetley & Ji, supra note 134, at 434-39; Norwitz, supra note 55, at 2 ("[T]he
relevant appraisal valuation date is the closing of a transaction, rather than the time of
announcement of the deal or the shareholder vote. This gives the appraisal arbitrageur a free
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the stockholder can back out and take the merger consideration (or
decline to buy stock in the first place), and if developments are positive,
the stockholder can seek appraisal to capture the newly revealed fair
value. 1
54
This criticism, however, is exactly backwards. Allowing
stockholders to "wait and see" simply balances the post-vote playing
field, which is otherwise almost always tilted in favor of the acquirer and
against the target holders. Following a shareholder vote in favor of a
transaction, shareholders are typically in a no-win situation akin to the
writer of a put option. If new information reveals the target company to
be more valuable than originally thought, the stockholders are still
entitled only to the merger price and do not share in the upside. If new
information reveals the company to be less valuable, the acquirer can
often find a way to let the deal fall through, or back out for the cost of a
termination fee of 2-3%.155
Indeed, one of the more common types of opportunistic transaction
exploits this "heads I win, tails you lose" dynamic of a delay between the
stockholder vote and the closing. In the recent acquisition of the grocery
store chain Safeway by Albertson's, for example, oil prices precipitously
declined following approval of the merger but prior to the closing.
56
Reduced oil prices caused the stock of similar grocery store companies
(which are highly sensitive to transportation costs) to nearly double,
while the amount to be received by Safeway stockholders remained
frozen at the merger price. 157 There can be little doubt that if rising oil
prices had cut the value of Safeway in half, Albertson's would have
found a way to walk away or amend the transaction, but the minority
stockholders had no such ability.
The risk of such opportunism is especially stark in light of the
information asymmetries between management and acquirers (following
due diligence) on the one hand and outside shareholders on the other.
158
option on positive developments between signing and closing. Indeed in the Safeway case,
appraisal seekers are expected to argue that they should be entitled to higher consideration
because grocery stocks rose between the signing and closing of that deal, in part due to the
decline in oil prices.").
154See Norwitz, supra note 55, at 2-3.
'55See Micah S. Officer, Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions, 69 J. FIN.
ECON. 431, 432-33 (2003).
116Liz Hoffman, Hedge Funds Plan to Seek Higher Price for Safeway, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/WSJ-sw-price.
157Id. ("Since the deal was announced, grocery stock have soared, helped in part by a
drop in oil prices .... Shares of market leader Kroger Co., for example, are up roughly 90%
over the past year.").
See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 653, 688 (2010) ("Everybody agrees that
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The Transkaryotic merger itself involved the announcement of
"extraordinarily positive" clinical trial results for one of the company's
drugs shortly after the record date-results that were almost certainly
known by insiders beforehand. 159 In both cases, large appraisal actions
by after-acquirers allowed the target's stockholders the opportunity to
share in upside surprises that would otherwise have been captured
entirely by the acquirers and their collaborators in management (for
whom the upside "surprise" may not always be so surprising).
More generally, it is far from clear why it would be desirable for
appraisal specialists to bear additional risk-including closing risk-by
forcing them to buy in early, before as much relevant information about
fair value as possible has been revealed. Doing so can only result in
under-enforcement of appraisal rights and under-compensation of
existing stockholders. 160  Of course, that may be precisely the goal of
those pushing the reforms. But again, even stockholders who do not
themselves pursue appraisal can benefit from specialists being able to
delay the investment decision, through the ability to sell their shares to
specialists at a higher price. If acquirers are concerned about the
possibility of intervening events prior to closing, they have many
options, including abbreviating the pre-closing period, structuring the
deal as a tender offer, or building flexibility into the pricing terms.
E. After-Acquiring Dissenters Should be Required to Prove
How Their Shares Were Voted
Some critics have suggested a more modest idea: that appraisal
petitioners should still be allowed to pursue appraisal for shares acquired
after the record date, but only if they can demonstrate that the actual
shares purchased were not voted in favor of the merger. 161 Even if this
requirement were desirable in theory, it would be highly problematic in
practice. At present, most stock in public companies is held in so-called
"fungible bulk" by the Depository Trust Company, making it impossible
to trace individual shares from seller to buyer and prove how those
shares were voted. 162
managers know more than shareholders. Everybody also agrees that agency costs arise when
managers use this informational advantage for their own gain.");I59 n re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 355 (Del. Ch. 2008).16
°See Abramowicz, supra note 139, at 736 (noting that claim-sellers will receive a
lower price as the claim-purchaser bears additional risk).
161See Norwitz, supra note 55 (suggesting that the "problem" of appraisal arbitrage
"can be substantially ameliorated ... by requiring those who would assert appraisal rights to
demonstrate that their shares were not voted in favor of the deal").
162See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2015).
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While technology could undoubtedly solve this issue, doing so
would create far more serious problems. Suddenly, shares voted against
a merger would possess a potentially valuable right that shares voted in
favor of the merger would lack. The fungibility of shares would thus be
destroyed, requiring would-be purchasers to determine and evaluate the
characteristics of the individual shares offered by individual sellers,
dramatically increasing search costs and imperiling market efficiency.
Worse yet, this requirement would create incentives for potentially
destructive strategic behavior by investors. Shares voted against a
merger, and thereby possessing appraisal rights, would often be more
valuable than shares voted in favor of the merger. Stockholders would
thus have an incentive to abstain or vote against even a merger they
favor, if they believed the merger would nonetheless be approved. In the
absence of a clear statement of the compelling policy goals that would be
furthered by a share-tracing requirement, this appears to be a can of
worms best left unopened.
F. Appraisal Will Scare Away Good Transactions
In many cases, criticisms of the form and procedure of appraisal
arbitrage likely reflect a more basic discomfort with the substance of
appraisal rights. This phenomenon is not unique to appraisal. For
example, it appears to us that much of the revulsion toward so-called
"patent trolls" is really directed at the substance of patent law. The
arguably excessive and overbroad nature of modern intellectual property
rights were tolerable when those rights were not effectively enforced by
patent holders. When patent trolls began enforcing those rights more
effectively, the rights themselves suddenly become intolerable.
Misplaced scorn that should be directed toward the substance of
intellectual property law is heaped on the patent trolls instead.1 63 A
similar dynamic may be at work in the criticism of appraisal. Criticism
is disproportionately directed toward the form, when what really rankles
is the substance.
We will leave to others the defense of intellectual property law (if
it can be defended), but our research leads us to believe that criticism of
the substance of appraisal rights is nearly-though not quite-as
misguided as criticism of the forms and procedures surrounding
appraisal. The substantive criticism is simply the following: If the target's
directors (or controlling shareholders) have breached their fiduciary
'
63See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Mark A Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption
of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 71 (2007) (calling for a weakening of the presumption of
patent validity, in part as a means of thwarting patent trolls).
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duties in entering into a merger agreement, the proper remedy is a
fiduciary duty class action. 164 A class action will bring all of the target's
shares before the court, ensuring both full deterrence and compensation
of all shareholders instead of a small group of specialists. In the absence
of a breach of fiduciary duties, it is folly to believe that a law-trained
judge can produce a more accurate valuation than the deal market. Even
where a court may properly find fair value to be higher than the
transaction price, such a prospect will deter transactions or simply cause
acquirers to hold back some portion of value that would otherwise be
paid to the target shareholders, in the expectation that it will be paid as a
"tax" to the squeaky wheels who seek appraisal. 165
As an initial matter, any appeal to fiduciary duty class actions is a
mirage. As we and others have documented elsewhere, whatever its
theoretical merits, the merger class action is thoroughly broken in
practice.1 66 Until very recently, virtually every merger faced a fiduciary
duty class action-regardless of the merits of the transaction-and the
vast bulk of these actions result in disclosure-only settlements or, at best,
a very small per share recovery. 67 More recently, the Delaware Court of
Chancery has sought to crack down on frivolous merger class actions and
meaningful settlements. 68  While we regard this as a positive
development, we suspect that the pathologies of merger class actions are
driven by a deeply embedded agency problem between plaintiffs'
attorneys and the shareholders they ostensibly represent and will be
impossible to eradicate. Even if the courts are relatively successful at
limiting nuisance claims, we suspect that the opposite - and potentially
more serious from a policy perspective - problem of half-hearted
prosecution of meritorious claims will be more difficult to address. As a
result, class actions hold out little hope as an effective tool of deterrence
or compensation.
Moreover, while the transaction particulars undergirding appraisal
are related to and can sometimes overlap with those relevant to the
fiduciary duty class action, the emphasis is crucially different. In a
fiduciary duty class action, the court is faced with the question of holding
individual directors personally liable for having breached their duties to
164 See, e.g., Paul Mahoney & Mark Weinstein, The Appraisal Remedy and Merger
Premiums, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 239, 273-74 (1999).
165See, e.g., id. (arguing that, "given the existence of legally enforceable fiduciary
duties, appraisal does not benefit public company shareholders").
166See Korsmo & Myers, Structure of Stockholder Litigation, supra note 1, at 889.
"71d. at 842-44.
168See, e.g., Seth Taube, David Sterling, & Amy Pharr Hefley, Delaware Court of
Chancery Cracks Down on Disclosure-Only Settlements, BAKER BOTTS (Feb. 4, 2016)
http://tinyurl.com/BB-04iil6.
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the stockholders. Courts are naturally and properly hesitant to take such
a drastic step lest directors become risk-averse, making decisions with an
eye toward minimizing the risk of personal liability rather than seeking
to maximize expected value for stockholders. 169 An appraisal action asks
a substantially more modest question: did stockholders get fair value for
their shares in the merger? If not, the acquirer must make up the
difference, but nobody is held personally liable.
To be sure, the questions in the two kinds of actions are frequently
related. Often, when stockholders do not get fair value for their shares, it
will be because the board has breached its fiduciary duties. We would
thus expect the strongest appraisal claims to also present strong fiduciary
duty claims, and vice versa. But forcing both types of claims into the
same analytical box is a self-evident mistake. Many types of managerial
sloth, incompetence, pressure, or collusion that courts have been
understandably hesitant to characterize as breaches of fiduciary duty can
nonetheless lead to minority stockholders receiving well below fair value
for their shares. In such situations, appraisal constitutes a useful middle
course between holding directors personal liable (and potentially
granting injunctions) and allowing unfair transactions to escape any
meaningful scrutiny. By providing a judicial backstop against
transactions that deny minority stockholders the fair value of their shares,
appraisal can reduce the discount applied to minority stakes and thereby
reduce companies' cost of capital.
Of course, the foregoing assumes that situations exist where the
court can arrive at a more accurate valuation of the company than did the
deal process. The incentive effects generated by appraisal flow
backward from the expected outcome of the proceeding in court. In an
appraisal proceeding, the stockholder is entitled to a judicial
determination of the value of the stockholder's shares. The court must
determine the "fair value" of the stock, and it may rely on any types of
evidence that is otherwise admissible. 170 A random judicial outcome-or
even one that is simply less accurate than the deal price-can serve no
"
69See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv. 83 116 (2004). As Chancellor Allen explained the problem,
directors and managers "enjoy... only a very small proportion of any 'upside' gains earned by
the corporation on risky investment projects. If, however, corporate directors were to be found
liable for a corporate loss . .. , their liability would be joint and several for the whole loss.
[T]his stupefying disjunction between risk and reward for corporate directors threatens
undesirable effects." Gagliardi v. Trifoods Inter., Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
.
7 See Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 711 (1983). See also Steven Davidoff
Solomon, Delaware Courts Pause on the Deal Price Do-Over, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://tinyurl.com/NYT-19iil5 ("The inputs for any valuation depend on future projections that
can change depending on the forecaster. In addition, valuation involves techniques and inputs
that are at the substantial discretion of whoever is doing the valuation.").
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useful deterrence function (nor any useful compensation function).
Thus, critics of appraisal have often decried its "casino-like"
outcomes, 171 and the chancellors themselves have occasionally voiced
their discomfort with the idea of a law-trained jurist being asked to
second-guess the judgment of the market.172  The natural conclusion
reached via such criticisms is that the transaction price itself should
generally be treated as the best evidence of fair value and ought to be
deferred to. In a spate of recent appraisal cases, the Delaware
chancellors have done just that. 173
As we have noted elsewhere, we are sympathetic to this
argument. 174 And, indeed, we believe the set of situations where the
appraisal given by a judge will be superior to that given by the deal
market will be relatively small. But it is important not to overstate the
case: the set is hardly empty. Most obviously, where the target
company's board has breached its fiduciary duties, few would argue that
the deal price is reliable. In such cases, the appraisal remedy can be a
useful "second best" tool of deterrence and compensation where serious
agency problems between plaintiffs' counsel and the class otherwise
cripple the effectiveness a fiduciary duty class action. This is especially
true because there is no reason to believe the relationship is strong
between deals where directors breach their duties and the cases where a
plaintiffs' attorney actually demonstrates it.
More broadly, critics miss the mark when they claim that appraisal
flies in the face of Delaware's traditional respect for market efficiency.
Such claims conflate the stock market (which is generally highly
efficient) with the deal market (which often is not). Among the other
requirements for market efficiency are liquidity and fungibility. Public
stock market prices are generally efficient because large numbers of
identical shares of stock in a given company trade on a highly liquid
market with millions of participants. The deal market, however-
dealing as it does with entire companies, rather than individual shares-
often lacks both qualities. No two companies are exactly alike, and the
market for whole companies is unavoidably chunky, rather than liquid.
As such, the deal market is unavoidably less efficient at valuing entire
11 James C. Morphy, Doing Away With Appraisal in Public Deals, 26 DEL. L. 30
(2008). See also Michael P. Dooley, Rules, Standards, and the Model Business Corporation
Act, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 45, 53 (2011) (noting that appraisal awards are sometimes
"two to three times the merger consideration, thereby turning appraisal into something of a
lottery")i72See, e.g., Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx Inc., 2013 WL 5878807, at * l(Del. Ch.
Nov. 1, 2013).
'
731d. at *2, 15.
174See Korsmo & Myers, AppraisalArbitrage, supra note 1, at 1608.
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companies (including the value of control) than the stock market is at
valuing minority shares.175
Nonetheless, where there is a true auction for a company, it would
likely be hubris for a court to second-guess the outcome. An auction,
however, is far from uniform practice in the real world. At the extreme,
unfaithful management, or an acquirer with a controlling stake or
contractual veto rights can deliberately hamstring the sale process. Less
dramatically, agreeing to a host of standard deal protections terms-
ranging from no-shop provisions to matching rights to the ubiquitous
termination fee-that courts have thus far found consistent with
Unocal'76 can serve to substantially impede an auction dynamic. The
widespread use of matching rights, which grant an acquirer the right to
match a subsequent superior bid, appears to us especially problematic. It
gives the acquirer the ability to bid far below its reservation price, secure
in the knowledge that it can simply match any superior bid should one
emerge. Even more problematically, it serves to ward off subsequent
bids in the first place-any potential subsequent bidder would be hesitant
to invest the time and resources to prepare a competing bid, knowing that
the original bidder could simply match any bid that did not overvalue the
company.177 In sum, there are a number of reasons to doubt the
efficiency of price formation even in an ideal deal market, let alone in the
real one.
On the other side of the coin, worries about valuations being
performed by "law-trained" judges-sometimes poignantly expressed by
the chancellors themselves178-are overblown. We are, after all, talking
about the Delaware Court of Chancery, not the traffic court of Mandan,
North Dakota. The five chancellors are world-leading specialists in
corporate law, often with substantial practice experience prior to joining
the court. Once on the court, they are tasked with valuation questions on
a routine basis. The ability of the unbiased and expert chancellors to
perform company valuations strikes us as often more credible than the
contingently-compensated investment bankers and corporate officers
they are often so anxious to defer to.
Taken together, the foregoing suggests that, in a substantial
percentage of cases, appraisal by a disinterested chancellor will produce
175See Guhan Subarmanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon Transactions,
28 J. CORP. L. 691, 693 (2003).
176Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
177See Brian J.M. Quinn, Re-Evaluating the Emerging Standard of Review for
Matching Rights in Control Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011, 1015-18 (2011).
'Union Illinois 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Group, 847 A.2d 340, 359 (Del.
Ch. 2004) ("For me (as a law-trained judge) to second-guess the price that resulted from that
process involves an exercise in hubris and, at best, reasoned guesswork.").
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a more accurate estimate of fair value than the deal market. We cannot
say with any confidence what this percentage is, but it is far from
obvious that the roughly 1 in 8 deals targeted by appraisal petitions in the
recent era of appraisal arbitrage is too high. If anything, the chancellors
have been overly modest in recent cases, seemingly deferring to the deal
price if the deal process can plausibly be described as an arm's-length
deal. Deference that may be justified in the context of a fiduciary duty
class action-where the question is one of personal liability and
incentives for risk-taking-is less appropriate in the context of appraisal,
where the question is simply one of comparative accuracy.
Where the court is able to achieve a more accurate valuation than
the deal market, concerns that appraisal arbitrage will deter beneficial
transactions evaporate. Of course appraisal will deter transactions-if it
did not, it would have far less public utility. But it will only deter
transactions that ought to be deterred-those that are not profitable after
paying fair value. If a transaction is only profitable for the acquirer if
they can pay the target stockholders less than the fair value of their
company as a going concern-which is all an appraisal proceeding
requires-then the transaction is value-destroying (or, at best, value-
shifting) and should not take place. Given the strongly encouraging
empirical picture of appraisal, there is no reason to think that appraisal
should stand in the way of any well-priced transaction.
G. Acquirers Will Hold Back Value to Pay Dissenters,
At the Expense of Other Stockholders
There is similarly little reason to fear that acquirers will simply
"hold back" value that would otherwise be paid to all stockholders, in
anticipation of paying an "appraisal tax." 179 This critique, inadvertently
or otherwise, tends to assess the effects of appraisal by contrasting it to a
world where fiduciary duty class actions or other mechanisms have
achieved optimal deterrence. Unfortunately, that is not the world we live
in. In reality, acquirers often face no meaningful deterrence other than
an adverse shareholder vote or a topping bid, possibilities that-for
reasons explained above-may in some circumstances be remote or
altogether lacking. Acquirers already "hold back" as much value as they
can get away with. In this light, the argument that appraisal works some
179Dufner et al., supra note 7, at 2 ("Failure to adequately address the rising tide of
appraisal arbitrage risks creating incentives for buyers to lower their price in anticipation of
having to pay appraisal arbitragers post-closing and therefore shifting value away from long-
term stockholders towards short-term arbitragers without advancing the underlying public
policy rationale for appraisal rights.").
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inappropriate "value transfer" from the acquirer to appraisal petitioners is
exactly backwards.180  The court-determined value transfer from
acquirers in appraisal is the very engine of deterrence against
opportunism in public-company mergers, but as we explain below that
deterrence only partial given the legal limitations on the appraisal
remedy.
Acquirers may respond to the appraisal threat by paying more or
otherwise improving the deal process, in the hopes of convincing the
court to defer to the deal price or of avoiding an appraisal petition
altogether. This is what happened in the Dell transaction, with partial
success. 181 Or they may end up paying value in an appraisal proceeding.
In either case, minority shareholders benefit-either directly through
improved merger consideration, or indirectly through appraisal
specialists bidding up the price of their stock above the price set by
passive merger arbitrageurs or even above the deal price.
As with most forms of regulation, appraisal exists in a world of
"second bests." We would prefer to rely on the integrity of a deal price
that emerges in a competitive market, but in many cases we cannot. We
would prefer to rely on a class mechanism to achieve optimal deterrence
and compensation, but we cannot. Appraisal offers a second best
alternative to both: (1) valuation by an impartial expert judge where there
is reason to believe it will be more reliable than a flawed deal market;
and (2) a partial method of aggregation that is not plagued by the agency
problems that hamper the class action.
H. The Threat of Appraisal Generates Too Much
Uncertainty for Acquirers
The goal of any acquirer is to determine the extent of target's
assets and liabilities; the due diligence process is so extensive because
potential acquirers wish to determine precisely what assets and liabilities
they will bid on. Critics suggest that appraisal presents a potential
liability for the acquirer that is different in kind than many others it will
inherit in the transaction because that liability cannot generally be
determined at the time the buyer performs its diligence on the rest of the
18°Jetley & Ji, supra note 134, at 432.
...See Bomba et aL, supra note 14, at 3 ("In the Dell going private transaction, for
example, the threat by Carl Icahn and others to seek appraisal of the shares they had amassed
after announcement of the deal effectively blocked the required shareholder vote (a majority of
the minority shares outstanding) and led to a $400 million increase in the merger price paid to
shareholders (as recently discussed publicly by legal counsel to the Dell special committee)." ).
Even after the price bump, many stockholders still pursued their appraisal, though a great
many backed away very early in the process.
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company. For this reason, defense lawyers describe appraisal liability as
if it is some unknowable quantity akin to a meteor strike.1 82 In reality,
the extent of the appraisal liability will be governed by two
straightforward variables: (1) the number of shares that seek appraisal
and (2) the merits of the appraisal claim-that is, how much a court
might be expected to award at trial. Both of these variables are quite
clear to buyers by the time of the transaction's closing. And they can be
discovered-and managed-as early in the process as the buyer wishes.
The number of dissenting shares in an appraisal case has a natural
limit of around 50% of the outstanding stock, even under
Transkaryotic. 1 3 As we discuss below, this puts an upper limit on the
potential deterrence value of appraisal, but for purposes of transactional
certainty it puts a cap on one aspect of potential appraisal liability. More
importantly, an acquirer that is worried about potential appraisal liability
can quite easily address that liability directly by putting a closing
condition in the merger agreement that allows the buyer to walk away in
the even more than, say, 10% of the shares demand appraisal. Such a
provision provides a hard ceiling of protection for the buyer. Naturally,
however, many targets may resist such a condition because it does not
provide enough certainty to the seller. 8 4  The buyer is thus in a
superficially difficult position: either include an appraisal condition and
impair the attractiveness of the bid, or leave out the appraisal condition
and potentially face the prospect of higher liability in an appraisal
proceeding. An additional complication with appraisal conditions is that
it generates the possibility that one holder of a comparatively small
portion of equity (5.1% or 10.1%) could hold out and frustrate the entire
transaction. For this reason, transaction advisors have cautioned that "it
1"2See Norwitz, supra note 55 ("Appraisal arbitrage creates significant risks for buyers,
who could find themselves obligated to pay much more for a target company than they had
expected to when negotiating the deal. While any buyer needs to know how much it will have
to pay to acquire a target, this need is especially acute in leveraged acquisitions where an
increase in acquisition costs could easily make the difference between a successful deal and a
failure, or even a bankruptcy.").
..
3The limit in a stockholder vote is the number of outstanding shares minus the
number of votes in favor of the transaction; the limit in a two-step transaction is the number of
shares minus the number of shares tendered. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic
Therapies, Inc., 2007 WL 1378345, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (showing that the limit in a
stockholder vote is the number of outstanding shares minus the number of votes in favor of the
transaction: the limit in a two-step transaction is the number of shares minus the number of
shares tendered).
184Bomba et al., supra note 14, at 5 ("Buyers in a competitive process will be wary to
include this condition as it would be likely to significantly diminish the competitiveness of the
bid as compared to bids not imposing the condition.").
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is difficult to predict the effect of an appraisal rights condition on a
transaction."
185
In reality, the number of shares demanding appraisal does not arise
from some unknowable process. The two relevant variables-the
number of shares demanding appraisal and the strength of the appraisal
claim-are jointly determined by the same set of facts, as our own work
has shown. This is evidence that the system is working well. Thus yet
another way to ensure that the number of shares demanding appraisal is
low is to make the appraisal claim as unattractive as possible. The way
to do that is to deliver the highest possible price to stockholders and to
ensure that the process of selling the company is as open and transparent
to potential alternative bidders as possible. One law firm has described
the dynamic in this way:
"If a transaction has been subject to an aggressive
competitive process and the deal price is generally viewed
as being high, the pursuit of appraisal would then seem
more unlikely. At the other extreme, a transaction with a
company controller or a private equity deal with major
management participation would be a probable suspect for
the assertion of appraisal rights, particularly if the sales
process appears to raise questions.
This again should reinforce the conclusion that appraisal is
generating beneficial deterrent effects in the merger market. This may of
course be why many serial acquirers and defense-side lawyers may not
like appraisal much; it is a substantive commitment to ensure that target
stockholders get what they are entitled to, even if the presence of board
negligence or malfeasance. But from the perspective of equity investors,
it is precisely the sort of protection that adds ex ante value.
Transactional practice can adapt very easily to other elements of
this new reality. A buyer, for example, might not know the strength of
the appraisal claim until the target files its proxy statement or tender
offer statement.187 These documents will describe the character of the
185 d
'
861d at 4.
"'
871d. at 5 ("Importantly, the company's sale process, as well as the range of fairness
established by the target company's bankers, is unknown to the buy-side party until the
company's proxy statement is furnished to shareholders. A buyer-for example, a private
equity firm in a management-led buyout (where the court can be expected to be skeptical of
the transaction)-may want to try to avoid attracting appraisal petitions by offering a price at
the high end of the fairness range and by acquiescing in (or even encouraging) a robust sale
process by the seller. Critically, however, even in this case, the buyer has no certainty as to
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sales process, any conflicts on the target side that may have hobbled the
negotiations, the advice that the financial advisors gave the board, and
the board's own internal estimates of the company's future performance.
For buyers worried about appraisal liability, however, it is a simple
matter to have the target make representations about those very
matters. 
188
I. The Interest Rate is Too High
The rate of interest awarded in appraisal proceedings also attracts
consistent fire from defense lawyers.189 Many critics contend that the
current statutory interest rate-equal to the federal funds rate plus 5%-
is too high, and that much of the recent boom in appraisal arbitrage
simply reflects attempts to leverage this rate of interest. 190 As we have
explained elsewhere, we are dubious that the statutory rate has played a
causative role in the recent rise in appraisal activity. 191  More
importantly, it is not clear that the statutory rate is too high in the first
place.
The question of the proper interest rate on judgments is complex,
and one we address in a separate forthcoming paper. The interest rate is
a policy lever that at the margin has effects on the volume and pace of
appraisal litigation. If appraisal is prone to under-enforcement, as
prominent commentators suggest, 192 then one plausible approach to
moving closer to optimal deterrence would be to increase the interest rate
in hopes of stimulating more appraisal claims. 193 As a policy response to
under-enforcement, however, this would be too blunt and likely
ineffective.
A natural but mistaken impulse is to compare the statutory interest
rate to some measure of pure credit risk like the interest rates on bonds
whether the seller may have improperly prepared the company projections, conducted the
market check or dealt with any conflicts, or otherwise may have acted in ways that could
render the process unreliable-- and thus invite appraisal demands.").
188Id. ("Buyers, particularly those in transactions that will be most at risk for attracting
appraisal petitions, may begin to seek ways to obtain some protection in this area, such as,
possibly, including representations as to the process in the merger agreement or requiring
information about the process before signing the merger agreement.").
189Dufiier et al., supra note 7 ("the current interest rate environment unambiguously
favors appraisal claims"); Bomba et al., supra note 14, at 2 ("the well above market statutory
interest payable on appraisal awards").
190See Korsmo & Myers, AppraisalArbitrage, supra note 1, at 1580.
'
911d. at 1554.
192See Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 39-40 (describing limitations of appraisal
remedy).
193See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REv. 63, 89 (2008).
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issued by acquirers. 194 In the first place, the claims held by appraisal
petitioners differ substantially from those held by bondholders, and
encompass litigation and durational risks in addition to credit risks.
More to the point, the appraisal petitioner is simply not a bondholder at
all. The petitioner is a former stockholder, whose equity investment has
been taken from her by board-initiated operation of law. It is perhaps
more sensible to look to the surviving company's cost of equity instead
of its cost of debt because that would compensate the petitioner for what
has been taken.
More broadly, the interest rate on judgments is often expected to
play a number of sometimes-conflicting roles. As noted, it should
adequately compensate the petitioner for what has been taken, it should
disgorge from the respondent company any unjust enrichment, but most
importantly it should aim to make both parties time-indifferent. In
addition, the interest rate should ideally not be a fact-intensive,
individualized question, lest it consume undue judicial resources or
increase litigation costs (and thereby increase the nuisance value of
claims).
In light of these considerations, the recent proposal of the
Delaware Bar Council195 represents a sensible compromise. The
proposed amendment borrows from the MBCA in allowing appraisal
respondents to pay some amount of cash that would stop further accrual
of interest on that amount. If the respondent views the interest rate as
excessive, it may avoid interest accrual by paying over cash at any time.
The shortcoming of the proposal is that it would allow for too much
strategic behavior by appraisal respondents. First, the company's option
can be exercised anytime, opening the door to tactical payment decisions
by the company. A better approach is to offer the company the option to
pay cash only within a discrete window following the transaction's
effective date. Second, the option creates the wrong incentives for
distressed and leveraged companies. Where a surviving company's cost
of debt is below the statutory interest rate, it will likely exercise its
option; where the company's cost of debt exceeds the statutory interest
rate-as will likely be the case in many leveraged transactions-the
surviving company will take advantage of the cheap financing. If the
option is to be unilateral, a significantly higher default interest rate may
actually be desirable, in terms of creating the proper incentives for all
194 Jetley & Ji, supra note 134, at 431 ("[I]n instances where the credit rating of the
entity responsible for paying the court-determined fair value to the petitioner is BB or higher,
the statutory rate more than compensates the petitioner on a risk-adjusted basis as well.").
195See An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General
Corporation Law, S. 75, 148th Cong. (June 24, 2015).
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parties. Faced with a higher default statutory interest rate, the party with
the best information on fair value at the outset of the proceeding--the
respondent-would have a strong incentive to pay over its best estimate
of fair value at an early date. This would minimize the effect of the
interest rate on the proceeding and at the same time minimize the social
costs invested in dispute resolution.
V. A REASONABLE SET OF REFORMS TO
DELAWARE'S APPRAISAL STATUTE
The aggressive reforms proposed by the defense bar have no
policy justification, but there are a variety of reforms to the appraisal
statute that could have beneficial effects, on top of the incremental
reforms recently adopted. The goals of our proposed reforms are to
enhance the deterrent effect of appraisal and to minimize any risk of
abuse. We offer a number of modest proposals here. A bolder set of
proposals might be designed to address what may be the biggest problem
with appraisal: In view of the empirical realities, the remedy is very
likely under-used, resulting in under-deterrence of opportunistic
transactions. 196
We explicitly reject as bad policy the defense lawyers' proposal to
alter the appraisal rules so as to strip beneficial owners of their rights if
they were not beneficial owners on the record date. But in view of the
mounting pressure from the defense bar to adopt some rule to that effect,
it is imperative to consider ways to minimize the negative impact of such
a change. We offer such a route here: by ensuring that record dates
always follow the mailing of the notice of appraisal rights by 20 days.
196A basic problem with appraisal as a mechanism of deterrence is that there is a
natural limit to the number of shares that can dissent. In a long-form merger or a tender offer,
realistically not more than 50% could conceivably demand appraisal, and in a short-form
merger not more than 10% could dissent. This, if anything, illustrates why one might fear that
a cunning acquirer would try to hold back value in merger negotiations. If the fair value of a
stock is $10 but the acquirer can get the votes for $9, the acquirer is better off paying only half
of the stockholders the extra $1. This creates a straightforward under-enforcement problem.
One possible avenue for reform that might help address this problem is to borrow from the
federal antitrust regime and allow dissenting stockholders to claim multiple damages. Under
federal law, plaintiffs who successfully make out an antitrust violation are entitled to treble
damages. The policy rationale for this rule is that antitrust law will otherwise be under-
enforced and that a damages multiple will push private enforcement closer to an optimal level.
This reasoning could quite easily be imported into the appraisal context. In long-form and
251(h) mergers, dissenting stockholders should be entitled to perhaps double damages, and in
short-form mergers, dissenters should be entitled to some higher multiple of damages. To
avoid over deterrence, the multiple should only apply to the amount by which the judgment
exceeds the amount that cashed-out stockholders received in the merger. The consequences of
any reform along these lines would be far-reaching and obviously would require a far more in-
depth examination to consider how it might alter the status quo.
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A. Eliminate the Exception for All-Stock Deals
Delaware's appraisal statute denies appraisal rights to stockholders
of target companies who are forced in a merger to accept only public-
traded stock.197 There is no policy justification at all for this limitation.
At one time, this might have been an important for accounting purposes:
paying more than a specified percentage of merger consideration in
cash-as appraisal forces acquirers to do-would in an earlier era have
prevented the acquirer from using pooling-of-interests accounting. That
is no longer the case, and more importantly from a corporate law
perspective there is simply no basis for making a distinction between
different forms of merger consideration.
Commentators sometimes suggest that this so-called "market out"
exception makes sense because the market sets the price of the stock
offered as consideration, and those dissatisfied with the merger
consideration can just sell into the deep, liquid market. 98 But this
misunderstands the relevant circumstances. A target stockholder might
feel shortchanged not because she is getting stock in the acquiring
company but because she is not getting enough of it. Just as easily as
they could be underpaid in cash, target stockholders could be underpaid
in stock of Exxon Mobil or in postage stamps or in anything else, for that
matter. 199 Nor does the type of merger consideration affect the Chancery
Court's ability to calculate fair value. The fact that target stockholders
are getting 1.5 shares of Beta Corp. as consideration in a merger does not
require the court to determine the value of Beta Corp. stock. The sole
task before the court would remain valuing the target company, precisely
'9'8 Del. C. § 262(b).
'
98JEFFREY HAAS, CORPORATE FINANCE 90 (2014) ("The market-out exception
recognizes that the market is superior to a judge when it comes to fairly valuing the shares of
dissenting public stockholders. If those stockholders are to receive stock as merger
consideration, the market-out exception encourages them to simply cash out before the merger
is consummated by selling their shares in the open market. When dissenting public
stockholders are forced to receive cash as merger consideration, by contrast, the market may
not provide a fair valuation.").
199Vice Chancellor Laster has made the same point in the context of Revlon scrutiny.
J. Travis Laster, Revlon is a Standard of Review: Why It's True and What It Means, 19
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 39-40 (2013) ("Negotiated acquisitions are bargaining
situations. Value is not conferred charitably on sell-side stockholders; it must be extracted. If
an acquirer expects a transaction to generate synergies, the acquirer should be willing to share
a portion of the synergies with the target as the price of getting the deal done and achieving the
remaining gains. In a cash deal, the gain-sharing takes the form of a higher dollar figure. In a
stock deal, the gain-sharing takes the form of a larger share of the post-transaction entity. In
either case, the gains are allocated through negotiation.").
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the same question the court must answer in all other appraisal
proceedings.
In the context of director duties in a change of control, Delaware's
jurisprudence has seized upon a similar distinction between stock and
cash consideration. 200 That distinction has attracted persuasive criticism
from Vice Chancellor Laster for fumbling the actual question of interest:
whether stockholders have received enough.0 1  In answering the
question, the form of consideration does not matter. Laster has argued
that that enhanced Revlon review should apply to stock-for-stock
transactions and that the Paramount doctrine should be discarded.0 2
Exempting an entire class of transactions from the appraisal
remedy ensures that they will remain beyond the beneficial governance
effects of appraisal. Moreover, the breadth of the exception invites
creative ways to avoid the merger statute. Not only are transactions
exempt from appraisal if stockholders receive stock in the surviving
company but also under section 262(b)(2)(B) if stockholders receive
shares of "any other corporation" that is publicly traded.20 3 An inventive
acquirer intent on underpaying target stockholders could avoid the
appraisal statute altogether by offering as merger consideration not $10
in cash but instead $10 worth of stock in Halliburton, or Crocs, or any
other publicly traded company. Inadequate consideration in any form is
still inadequate consideration. The market out exception should be
eliminated.
200A line of Delaware precedents holds that the application of Revlon and its doctrinal
progeny turns on the percentage of stock and cash that target stockholders receive. See
Paramount Commc'n, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51 (Del. 1989); In re Smurfit-
Stone Container Corp. Sholder Litig., 2011 WL 2028076, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011);
QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Commc'n, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1266-67 (Del. Ch. 1993).20 1Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, 2011 WL 229777 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2011)
(Transcript) Vice Chancellor Laster suggested that engaging in a "dance on the head of a pin"
debate about whether enough cash present to trigger Revlon is beside the point. The relevant
inquiry for Revlon purposes is whether "target stockholders are in the end stage." Cash
consideration has always triggered a change in control under Revlon because "if you want
more cash for your shares, this is the only time you have to get it." Stock consideration has
been treated differently, the idea being that securing a premium now may not be critical
because stockholders can obtain some future control premium down the line on their stock
consideration. But as Laster noted, "target stockholders today are bargaining for what their
share of that control premium will be," and in that sense this is similarly the final period
because "this is the only opportunity where you can depend on your fiduciaries to maximize
your share of that value." Vice Chancellor Laster correctly treated the form of consideration as
irrelevant and focused instead what should be the ultimate object of inquiry in Revlon:
"extract[ing] the premium, both in the sense of maximizing cash now, and in the sense of
maximizing [target stockholders'] relative share of the future entity's control premium."2
°
2Laster, supra note 199, at 55
2"8 Del. C. § 262.
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B. A Minimum Threshold for Appraisal
An appraisal petition is the start of a proceeding that has no motion
to dismiss or other pre-trial opportunities to sort strong claims from the
weak. Those who preserve their appraisal rights and file a petition are
entitled to press all the way to trial, and the costs of defending such a
proceeding can run into the millions of dollars. This presents the risk
that a stockholder with a small number of shares could threaten to push a
defendant all the way to trial and extract a settlement for less that the
costs of litigation. As we have explained, we believe the procedural
structure of appraisal-where plaintiffs can proceed only on behalf of
their own holdings and must forego the merger consideration and bear
their own costs-is an effective deterrent to this sort of behavior. At
some low values, the dissenter does not have a credible threat to go to
trial at all and should not be able to force a settlement for much of
anything. A more plausible threat is that a plaintiffs' attorney might file
an appraisal petition in hopes of obtaining backdoor discovery into the
character of the sales process, and that inquiry might provide the grounds
for a post-closing fiduciary class action.
The empirical evidence presented in Figure 1 suggests that, to the
extent that this behavior may exist at all, it is a limited problem. The
Delaware Council nevertheless proposed, and the legislature adopted, the
very reasonable prophylactic measure of requiring that the dissenting
group meet some de minimis threshold in order to proceed with
appraisal.20 4 They set that threshold at $1 million in stock at the merger
consideration or 1% of equity value, whichever is lower.20 5 This is a
sensible approach to the potential problem of nuisance suits, which can
have no beneficial deterrent effect.
The underlying intuition is that if the transaction does not bother
holders of more than $1 million in stock, there is no sense in forcing
defendants to defend an appraisal proceeding. If anything, the dollar
amount minimum is set too low in the proposal. A more reasonable level
might be more like $2.5 or $3 million, which is large enough to ensure
that it cannot be profitable to settle simply for the costs of litigation.
There is no reason to limit this approach to appraisal: this de minimis
threshold could usefully be imported to derivative litigation, securities
litigation, and merger class actions, as well.
Importantly, this does not close the courthouse door to small
holders. The proposed thresholds look to the size of the dissenting
2
04See An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General
Corporation Law, S. 75, 148th Cong. (June 24, 2015).2
11 See id.
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group, not the individualized holdings of the members of the dissenting
group. Thus, if many small holders were skeptical of a transaction and
all demanded their appraisal rights, they could press the claim
collectively because as a group they exceed the threshold even if none
did individually, even without selling to an appraisal arbitrageur.
A related reform that has some initial appeal is to craft a safe-
harbor from the appraisal statute where the character of the sales process
is so exemplary that no one could doubt that the resulting price was equal
to the fair value of the stock. We ourselves have argued in favor of such
a reform in the past.2 °6 The trouble of course is crafting a workable
standard. One natural but fundamentally flawed idea is to simply import
the result of any Revlon inquiry.20 7 If the target directors met their
Revlon obligations, then the appraisal price must be the negotiated
merger price. This suffers from a multitude of problems. First,
stockholders very rarely know whether the board has complied with its
Revlon obligations; nearly every transaction is attacked by a merger class
action, but those rarely end with anything other than a settlement in
which the Revlon claims (among others) are released, and the only
insight into the actual merit of the Revlon claim comes from a plaintiffs'
attorney on the cusp of receiving a fee assuring the court that his inquiry
revealed nothing. The availability of appraisal--,a remedy that serves a
useful governance purpose-cannot turn on a broken class action system
that systematically fails to perform any reliable governance purpose.
More importantly, the Revlon inquiry asks the wrong question. A
board could quite easily meet its fiduciary obligations in circumstances
where there is no reason to suppose the outcome has any bearing on the
fair value of the stock. Imagine a negotiation between a target company
and a controlling stockholder who refuses to sell his stock. The board
could do an exemplary job negotiating with the controller, such that they
met and even exceed their fiduciary expectations. It would be absurd to
hold those directors liable for anything. At the same time, if there were
no competitive pressure whatsoever on the bidder, there would be no
reason to believe that the negotiated price constitutes the fair value of the
stock. Yet another problem is that even what looks like a clean process
from the outside can be undermined from within by frauds large and
small. It is difficult if not impossible to craft a safe harbor focused on
procedure and form that cannot be gamed to the disadvantage of minority
stockholders.
For these reasons, the reluctant conclusion is that, as a practical
matter, drafting a safe harbor is a fool's errand. Even without a de
206See Korsmo & Myers, AppraisalArbitrage, supra note 1, at 1608.2°71d
"
2017
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
minimis rule like the one recently adopted, the risk of a petitioner
dissenting in hopes of reaching a costs-of litigation settlement is low.
With such a rule, it should approach zero. The appraisal remedy itself
provides the soundest protection against abuse. Our evidence shows that
petitioners appear to be targeting a group of transactions where
something appears amiss. Defense lawyers themselves have
acknowledged as much.20 8 The current system works well enough that
too much would be lost by attempting to create safe harbor.
C. Improving Merger-related Disclosures
Delaware should enhance the disclosure requirements imposed on
companies engaged in transactions triggering appraisal rights. When a
corporate board presents stockholders with an investment decision like a
tender offer or an appraisal election, "[t]he directors of a Delaware
corporation are required to disclose fully and fairly all material
information within the board's control., 20 9 Delaware borrows from the
federal standard of materiality, noting that a fact is material when "there
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote., 210  The materiality standard in
Delaware, as in federal law, does not require that the information would
necessarily change the vote of a reasonable investor.211 The standard is a
lower one: Information is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as havinq significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available."
In spite of the facial liberality of the materiality standard, the
interpretation has at times been too parsimonious. Consider Skeen v. Jo-
Ann Stores, Inc.,213 where stockholders alleged that a company's merger-
related disclosures failed to provide stockholders with the information
necessary to make an informed decision about appraisal. According to
the stockholders, the financial disclosures released by the company were
deficient because they failed to include: a summary of the methodologies
208 Bomba et al., supra note 14, at 4 ("[T]he transactions that attract appraisal petitions
generally involve some basis for a belief that the deal price significantly undervalues the
company-that is, transactions involving controlling stockholders, management buyouts, or
other transactions for which there did not appear to be a meaningful market check or
significant minority shareholder protections as part of the sales process.").209Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998).21Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (quoting TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).2 1 TSC Indus., Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
2 12
1d.213Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170 (Del. 2000).
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and fairness ranges generated by the company's financial advisor; the
projections of future performance prepared by company management;
and prices at which the company had discussed sale in the year prior to
214the merger. This information is obviously material under the
traditional tests. In forming a meaningful opinion on the fair value of the
company, the stockholder would plainly need access to that information.
The Delaware Supreme Court, however, held that disclosure of that
information was not required under Delaware's materiality standard.215
The Court held that "[o]mitted facts are not material simply because they
might be helpful" and that the undisclosed information would not have
"significantly altered the total mix of information already provided., 216
It was not enough, in the Court's view, for the stockholders to "merely
allege that the added information would be helpful in valuing the
company.
, 217
Not long after Skeen, then-Vice Chancellor Strine implicitly
criticized the decision, noting that stockholders are often at a severe
informational disadvantage when forced to make decisions about
tendering or demanding appraisal.218 In the context of disclosures related
to a fairness opinion, Strine pushed beyond the inadequate strictures of
Skeen and held that stockholders were entitled to "a fair summary of the
substantive work performed by the investment bankers upon whose
advice the recommendations of their board as to how to vote on a merger
or tender rely., 219  Subsequent decisions have adopted a similarly
context-specific approach to materiality in the disclosure of financial
data and other valuation-related issues.220 The Supreme Court has
supplied a useful remedy for disclosure violations: quasi-appraisal, an
equitable remedy that mirrors the statutory appraisal by allowing a
stockholder to proceed on appraisal claims an opt-out basis for all
cashed-out stockholders. 221  Nevertheless, the underlying disclosure
"'Id. at 1173.
2 15 See id.2 11Id. at 1174.
217Id. The Court affirmed the central holding of Skeen in McMullin v. Beren, though at
the same time it held that a disclosure claim based on an extraordinary set of omissions could
withstand a motion to dismiss. 765 A.2d 910, 925 (Del. Supr. 2000) (noting that the
disclosures alleged omitted "indications of interest from other potential acquirers; the handling
of these potential offers; the restrictions and constraints imposed by [the parent] on the
potential sale of [the target]; the information provided to [the financial advisor] and the
valuation methodologies used by [the financial advisor]").
218In re Pure Res., Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 450 (Del. Ch. 2002).
"1Id. at 449.
220See, e.g., In re Orchard Enter. Inc., S'holders Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 16-23 (Del. Ch.
2014); In re PNB Holding Co., S'holders Litig., 2006 WL 2403999, at *16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18,
2006).
221Berger v. Pubco, 976 A.2d 132, 138 (Del. 2009).
2017
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
standard is still that "a disclosure that does not include all financial data
to make an independent determination of fair value is not per se
misleading or omitting a material fact., 222 This standard is inadequate.
The standard that Delaware should embrace is precisely the one
rejected in Skeen: "[S]tockholders should be given all the financial data
they would need if they were making an independent determination of
the fair value., 223 For a stockholder confronting a choice about appraisal,
the essential task is to form an independent estimate of the fair value of
the company. To do that, the stockholder is entirely reliant on the
disclosure choices made by the board of directors, who naturally wish to
avoid releasing any information that would paint their negotiated
transaction in an unflattering light. The object of corporate law in this
area should thus be to ensure that the company discloses sufficient
information to put stockholders on an equal informational footing in
determining the company's fair value. The costs of additional disclosure
are low-both in terms of the direct costs associated with collecting and
disclosure and the indirect costs of informing competitors or others who
could access the disclosures. By contrast, the potential benefits are high
in terms of enhancing a private enforcement system that the evidence
indicates is working well.
In terms of disclosure of financial material, Delaware law should
require that the company disclose all information that reasonably bears
on the value of the company. The disclosures should be rigorous enough
to permit stockholders to determine the fair value the company and to
perform a critical evaluation of the recommendations by the board. This
would require that companies disclose forecasts and projections prepared
by the company, and in particular a description of any reports and
presentations bearing on value that were either presented to the board or
prepared by the board in connection with the merger. Additional
disclosure requirements are not a complete prophylactic against crucial
omissions, as recent cases have made clear.224 But they would constitute
at least a step in the direction of ameliorating the grave informational
asymmetry between managers and stockholders.
222See Nguyen v. Barrett, 2015 WL 5882709, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2015).
22 Skeen v. JoAnn Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. Supr. 2000).224See In re Dole Food Co., Inc., Sholder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 27, 2015) (finding that management deliberately undermined projections); In re Rural
Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014) (finding projections inadequate because bankers
derailed process).
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D. A Better Version of the Deal Advisors'Proposal
The one commonality among all defense lawyers' commentary has
been a single-minded focus on depriving beneficial owners of their
appraisal rights if they did not own the stock on the record date for
voting on the merger. 22' Given the attention heaped upon that idea, the
Council must be the object of substantial pressure to propose an
amendment along those lines. We here offer a variation on that
proposal-not because it is a desirable reform in and of itself, but as a
way to achieve the critics' stated goals while limiting any attendant
policy damage done.
The historic relationship between stockholder voting and appraisal
is one many commentators believe to be important and wish to
226preserve. But there is no obvious policy justification to do so.
Stockholders are dissenting from the merger transaction, not from the
vote. There may be good reasons why the acquirer should be on notice
of the number of dissenting stockholders before it chooses to close the
transaction, but the connection between the appraisal right and the vote
on the merger is one of pure inertia. It would be entirely sensible to
eliminate the language about voting in Section 262.227
In framing this issue, defense lawyers have set up a false choice,
perhaps deliberately. Defense lawyers wish to deny appraisal rights to
everyone except those who happened to hold the stock on the record
date,228 not because of some historic connection between the two
concepts but because it forces stockholders to operate at a severe
information deficit. Stockholders are informed of the record date
sometimes well after it has passed, when they learn of it in the company's
definitive proxy statement.
It is easy to forget how little stockholders know in the wake of a
merger announcement. 229 They know only the principal terms of the deal
225See infra Part III.D.
226See Mirvis, supra note 8 ("Billions of dollars are now committed to buy appraisal
claims for investors who can scarcely be said to have 'dissented,' as they did not even own the
stock they ever had the right to vote on."),
http://tara.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2015/O1/2I/delaware-court- decisions-on-appraisal- rights-
highlight- need-for-reform/.
227,,... Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a person who is the beneficial
owner of shares of such stock held either in a voting trust or by a nominee on behalf of such
person may, in such person's own name, file a petition or request from the corporation the
statement described in this subsection." 8 Del. C. § 262 (e).22
'See infra Part III.D.229 Jetley and Ji overlook this crucial point. See Jetley & Ji, supra note 134, at 427, 441(suggesting that the 54 days, on average, between the announcement date and the record date
is "a meaningfully long period to observe the evolution of the merger arbitrage spread and the
deal process").
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and the contents of the merger agreement, which are filed publicly and
promptly. But stockholders are otherwise stranded on an informational
desert. They know nothing about key information that will help them
evaluate the merger: about the company's standalone projections, about
the conduct of management in the negotiations, about the diligence and
breadth of the company's sales process, about potential conflicts of
interest that the company's advisors may have, and so forth. They learn
this information only when they see the company's proxy statement,
which also serves as formal notice of appraisal rights under Delaware
law. This is also generally when they learn of the record date-and that
record date is almost always publicly disclosed after it has passed. In the
Transkaryotic transaction, for example, the company issued a press
release on June 13, 2005 disclosing that the board had set June 10 as the
record date,230 and the final proxy was not available to stockholders for
still another two weeks.231 The consequence of this confluence of factors
is that the only stockholders who have enough information to object (or
sell to someone who can object) are those that have seen the proxy
statement, but any stockholder who has seen the proxy statement would,
under the defense lawyer's proposal, be barred from alienating the
appraisal right along with the stock. Some defense lawyers have even
noted this fact as a bug in the current system instead of the virtue that it
is. 232 It is little different than a restaurant asking a patron to order her
meal before she has a chance to look at the menu.
An additional difficulty with the law firms' proposal to vest the
record date with some magical importance for purposes of appraisal is
that the record date is controlled by the very board that may have sold the
company for too little. The same fatal flaw is true of other related
proposals offered by defense lawyers, like one to replace the effective
date of the merger as the relevant valuation date in an appraisal with
some earlier date like the stockholder vote date.233 The timing and
structure of these fundamental transactions are entirely within the control
23 0See Press Release, Justine D. Koenigsberg, Senior Director, Corporate
Communications, Press Release TKT Announces Expiration of Both Hart-Scott-Rodino
Waiting Period and Sec Review Period of Preliminary Proxy Statement (June 13, 2005),
available at http://tinyurl.com/SEC- 16vi05.
23 See Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. Definitive Proxy Statement, filed with SEC on
June 27, 2005, available at http://tinyurl.com/SEC-27vi06.232See Bomba et al., supra note 14, at 2 ("With this timing advantage, investors can
review information in the company's proxy statement relating to its sale process and fairness of
price, can assess any pre-closing shareholder litigation that has been commenced, and can
evaluate market, industry and target company conditions at a time much closer to the merger
closing date (as of which time the court will determine fair value in an appraisal proceeding) as
compared to the time when the deal price was negotiated and then voted on.").233Norwitz, supra note 55.
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of the board, the very body that may have failed to secure fair value.
Moreover, stockholder votes are sometimes held far in advance of the
closing of a transaction.
There is a simple way of meeting the defense lawyers' goals
while at the same time preserving the robust and beneficial market for
appraisal-eligible shares: limiting the discretion of the board in setting
the record date to ensure that cannot keep stockholders in an information
vacuum. If the Council were to recommend stripping appraisal rights
from beneficial holders who did not own the stock on the record date, it
should also propose a related change to Section 213(a) of the DGCL,
which addresses the setting of the record date.234 Section 213(a) outlines
the procedure for the fixing of a record date by the board.235  It
contemplates two record dates: one fixing the date to determine
stockholders entitled to notice of the meeting, and another fixing the date
236for determining the stockholders entitled to vote at the meeting. The
straightforward way to fix the defense lawyers' proposal is to add the
following language to Section 213(a): "Notwithstanding anything else in
this subsection, for any meeting of stockholders where stockholders will
vote upon a transaction that triggers rights under § 262 of this title, the
record date for determining the stockholders entitled to vote at such
meeting shall not be less than 20 dates after the mailing of any applicable
notice under § 262(d)(1) of this title." This would ensure that target
stockholders have the ability to sell into a thick and informed market
while their shares still have the full complement of stockholder rights
that the DGCL contemplates.
One possibility is that defense lawyers' commitment to tying
voting to appraisal rights is fleeting, representing little more than a
seemingly simple way to kill the only serious remedy available to
stockholders in the event of an opportunistic merger. Some have been
comfortable saying as much: "The sensible solution is to amend the
statute to make express that appraisal rights are not available for shares
purchased after public announcement of the terms of the merger. ,,237
But this approach to reform-vesting the record date with more
significance while ensuring that stockholders have enough information
and time to make good decisions-preserves the virtues of the current
system and meets the stated objections of the defense bar.
234See 8 Del. C. § 213(a).23 51d
23 6
1d.237Mirvis, supra note 8.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The appraisal remedy has emerged in recent years as one of the
most useful avenues for relief from an opportunistic merger. As we have
shown, appraisal constitutes a very small percentage of all merger-related
litigation involves appraisal; merger class actions are nearly 20 times as
prevalent. And those transactions that are targeted by an appraisal
petition are more likely to have a lower expected deal price and more
likely to involve an insider cash-out transaction. The specialists in
appraisal, in other words, appear to target their resources on transaction
that call for additional scrutiny. This ought to represent private
enforcement at its best.
The rise of appraisal has not brought acclaim but instead it has
provoked a concerted effort to undermine its effectiveness. Each
possible argument deployed against appraisal-it will deter beneficial
mergers or it will cause buyers to hold back value or it will allow
appraisal specialists to prey on other stockholders-cannot stand up to
serious analysis. The Delaware council should again decline to pursue
any of the amendments proposed by Dole or the defense bar. Instead, if
the Council revisits the issue, it should propose amendments that
eliminate the exception to appraisal rights for all-stock transactions,
improve merger-related disclosures, and adopt a de minimis requirement
for appraisal. To the extent that the Council proposes an amendment that
would eliminate the appraisal rights of beneficial owners who acquire
after the record date, the Council should constrain the discretion of
companies in setting the record date. The record date should be no
earlier than 20 days after the mailing of the notice of appraisal rights.
This would at least preserve a substantial portion of the benefits of an
active market in appraisal rights, thereby aiding minority stockholders
and decreasing the cost of equity capital for Delaware corporations.
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